

## Between Resistance and Diplomacy: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Télé Liban News Bulletin Headlines during the Israeli War of 2024 on Lebanon

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### ABSTRACT

This study investigates how Télé Liban, the only state-owned Lebanese television, framed the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon through uncovering the hidden meaning in the headlines of the news bulletins. Employing Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis, the study analyses 19 headlines of four news bulletins, complemented by observations from a broader sample of 15 bulletins. The analysis focuses on the linguistic choices of the headlines, framing strategies, and their alignment with the broader sociopolitical context. It revealed that Télé Liban consistently aligned with the Lebanese ministerial statement by clearly identifying Israel as the enemy and consecrating the legitimacy of the Resistance through repeated use of terms such as "the Israeli enemy" and "the Resistance." The study also showed a strong emphasis on diplomatic activity, reflecting the official Lebanese discourse that favours international assistance and diplomatic channels. The analysis discovered a diverse set of frames, including those related to power, fear, nationalism, legitimacy, and diplomacy, which shaped how Télé Liban represented the war. Overall, the findings demonstrate that Télé Liban exhibited a discourse characterized by clarity in delineating both the adversary and the resistance; however, it failed to present a cohesive national narrative that underscored unity among the Lebanese populace.

**Keywords:** *Télé Liban, Israeli war on Lebanon, news bulletins, news headlines, framing.*

### INTRODUCTION

The latest Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon began in late 2023. It escalated on September 23, 2024, causing widespread attacks on Lebanese territories, displacement, infrastructure destruction, and disruptions to life, particularly affecting civilian populations and essential services (Atoui et al., 2025). Over 1.34 million people had been displaced during the 66-day Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon, and 25% of the Lebanese nation was subject to mandatory evacuation orders (Khayyat, 2025). According to a report prepared by the National Council for Scientific Research, the number of Israeli attacks on Lebanon, from October 2023 until the end of November 2024, reached 14,775 attacks. The results of that report also showed that the Israeli attacks on Lebanon led to the martyrdom of 2,678, including 736 women and 248 children, and led to the injury of 16,520, including 2,827 women and 1,436 children (National Council for Scientific Research, 2024, p. 15). The same report found that the Israeli attacks did not exclude journalists in Lebanon, as the number of journalists who were killed by the Israeli attacks reached 12, and 9 journalists were killed (National Council for Scientific Research, 2024, p. 17).

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In the context of its psychological warfare on Lebanon, the Israeli army issued warning statements to evacuate buildings in various Lebanese regions through the Israeli army spokesperson Avichai Adraee. A project was conducted at Al Maaref University (MCFA, Department of Journalism and Digital Media) to identify the number of warnings issued by the Israeli army during its war on Lebanon from October 2024 to November 27, 2024, and to analyse this data (Hazimeh, 2025). The Python programming language was used to automatically collect data from Lebanese news platforms and social media platforms, primarily X. The results showed that the total number of warnings issued by the Israeli army toward different areas in Lebanon was 354. These were distributed as follows: 266 in the southern district of Beirut (Dahieh), 67 in southern Lebanon, 16 in the Bekaa region, and 5 in the capital city of Beirut (Hazimeh, 2025).

However, the Lebanese media coverage of the Israeli war on Lebanon lacked professionalism. A report prepared by Maharat Foundation identified the characteristics of Lebanese media coverage of the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon and they were;

- i. Promoting of the Israeli narrative through the transmission of statements issued by the spokesperson of the Israeli army, which aimed to justify the aggression and the bombing of certain buildings.
- ii. Providing airtime to guests whose inflammatory positions exacerbated the existing national divide.
- iii. Most media coverage appeared to be lacking in depth and substance, with television stations focusing their cameras primarily on live broadcasts and filling airtime with commentators from various backgrounds without sufficient editorial filtering.
- iv. A notable absence of legal framing or analysis concerning Israel's violations of international charters and the core principles of international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions (Maharat Foundation, 2024, pp. 15 & 16).

Regarding the statements issued by Avichay Adraee, the spokesperson for the Israeli army, including evacuation warnings and similar announcements, the same report pointed to the absence of a comparable Lebanese media spokesperson to that Israeli spokesperson with a similar level of visibility and influence (ibid). The report pointed also to the lack of engagement by the Lebanese Ministry of Information and the country's security agencies in fulfilling its communicative role (ibid).

This absence of professionalism will lead to a gap between the public and the state media. In addition to this gap, the main scholarly gap relates to the dearth of the analysis of the discursive practice of the Lebanese state-controlled media, mainly Télé Liban. Drawing on this academic gap, it can be argued that there is an absence of a unified Lebanese national media policy. Notably, the Lebanese viewers prefer the private media outlets since the high concentration of audience share among the major four private Lebanese companies is 80% in 2024 (Media Ownership Monitor, 2024). This reflects that there is a problem in the Lebanese media coverage of the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon.

In addition, there was also a clear difference in the way media outlets documented events, both in terms of the adopted approach and the quality of the information provided. Some outlets adopted a purely political perspective, whether before or after the airstrikes, often framing the attacks in a way that is more akin to justifying them, without considering the

potential civilian casualties or the extensive destruction. In contrast, other outlets offered coverage that was more professional and comprehensive (Ayoub & Saghiyya, 2025).

Moreover, the near-total absence of the Lebanese state-owned television from the screens of the Lebanese public during crises and wars further amplifies the influence of private media institutions and reinforces their roles and agendas. Thus, the focus took place on the roles of private media institutions, without paying attention to the responsibilities and roles of state-controlled media outlets.

This research aims to explore the agenda of Télé Liban during the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon. Drawing on this aim, the question postulated is, how did Télé Liban report the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon, and what was the media agenda adopted by Télé Liban in its news coverage of the 2024 war on Lebanon as a national broadcaster?

To achieve this aim, this research applies a discourse analysis method to the headlines of selected news bulletins from Télé Liban, revealing how this television frames events.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The review of literature needs pointing to the history of Télé Liban. In this vein, the understanding of the status quo of Télé Liban and its agenda cannot be separated from pointing to details related to its founding circumstances and historical development.

### *a) Origins of Télé Liban: A Commercial Beginning*

Contrary to other nations in the Arab region, Télé Liban began as a commercial initiative owned by the private sector. The "Lebanese Television Company" was founded in 1959 followed by another commercial television "Tele-Orient" in 1962 (El-Richani, 2022). The creation of the second channel stoked fierce rivalry between the two companies as they competed for enticing Lebanese viewers with live shows like "Beirut at Night," "Abou Salim," and "Abou Melhem," as well as international TV series, American and Egyptian movies, professional wrestling, and a range of talk shows about politics, the arts, and society. There were also news bulletins specific to each station (El-Richani, 2022).

Awada (2015) points to the restrictions imposed on the two companies by the Lebanese government, because they were fully owned by the private sector. These restrictions included that the programs aired must not threaten national security nor vilify religions. In addition, the programs must not support political parties nor any politician. The two companies were also required to broadcast news programs and any official news items or programs prepared by the Lebanese Ministry of Information free of charge.

### *b) Impact of the Civil War on Broadcasting*

The Lebanese Civil War erupted in April 1975 has an impact on the two companies because each company is controlled by different parties. The first television station was located in Tallet El-Khayat and the other station was located in Hazmieh. The first two years of the war (1975–1976) witnessed a dichotomisation in the news bulletins between the two television stations. Notably, both television stations suffered from a financial crisis as a result of the sharp decline of advertising revenues (Awada, 2015).

In 1977, the Lebanese government stepped in and decided to combine the two companies into one television station Télé Liban and controlled half of its shares. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri eventually bought the remaining 50% of shares and sold them to the government in 1996 (El-Richani, 2022).

Although the Lebanese government granted Télé Liban in 1977 a 25-year license with an exclusive monopoly over the television sector in Lebanon, the resurgence of the civil war in 1978 was an opportunity for a number of political factions to launch their own private television stations (Awada, 2015).

During the civil war, the failure of the public broadcaster to respond to the needs of the people made it simple for privately owned audio-visual stations to tap this vast market. This implies that the political reporting by the private audio-visual stations exacerbated the political fragmentation among the Lebanese society during the civil war (Nötzold, 2009).

### *c) Debating State Media Ownership*

In identifying the concept of state media ownership, the government holds complete authority to oversee content and to hire or dismiss personnel. In this regard, there are mainly two opposing perspectives on media ownership: pro-state ownership and anti-state ownership. Proponents of state media ownership argue that a lack of consumer awareness plays a crucial role in their support for state-run media, asserting that privately owned media caters to the interests of the elite and shields the public from confronting radical perspectives (Milosavljević & Poler, 2024). In this vein, Setiawan et al. (2024) concluded that “media ownership does not affect news content, because media owners understand that the market for media readers is quite dominant and by news content” (p. 293).

Conversely, critics of state-controlled media argue that a state monopoly on media would skew information, threaten democratic processes, and hinder informed choices (Milosavljević & Poler, 2024). In this context, Utemissov (2023) compares two state-run TV channels, “Qazaqstan” and “Al-Jazeera”, stating that due to the high level of distrust of official media resources in Kazakhstan among the population, its alignment with the government’s agenda and its role in defending the leadership’s interests, has led to a drop in the channel’s viewership and ratings. On the other hand, due to its critical media coverage and criticism of the political leadership, Al-Jazeera has high ratings in comparison to other TV channels in the region.

### *d) Media Hegemonic Circle of Power*

In discussing media ownership, it is important to recognize that a hegemonic circle of power exists between the private and the public spheres, which serves the interests of the elite and prevailing ideologies by influencing public perception through media framing because there is a link between the government agenda and the corporate interests (Gul, 2024).

In a case where a democratic political framework permits media conglomerates to dominate mainstream media, alternative media serves as a platform that is untainted by dominant capital influence (Yoedtadi & Pribadi, cited in Sofian et al., 2023). In polarized media systems with weak states, such as Lebanon, intense political conflicts and media fragmentation make it difficult to classify all outlets, including opposition media, as part of a single regime, as their loyalties often shift with temporary political alliances (Farag et al., 2025).

During the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon, the promotion of the Israeli narrative through airing the statements issued by the Israeli army spokesperson who aimed to justify the attacks and the bombing of certain Lebanese buildings reflects the absence of the state-controlled media to provide a unifying, counter-hegemonic narrative.

*e) State-Owned Media: The Role during Wartime*

During complex crises such as wars, governments may take direct control of media platforms under the guise of national security, ensuring that only approved narratives reach the public (Youvan, 2024). However, in democracies, the government may rely on friendly media entities to align their messaging, subtly exerting control without overtly infringing on press freedom (ibid).

In the event of a crisis, it is typically expected that the nation experiencing the crisis serves as the primary source for the media and press looking for updates on the situation (Shiang, Chibundu, & Wilson, 2020). It raises concerns when local publications begin to reference international sources instead of relying on local ones (ibid).

When examining the role of state-owned media during wartime, it is important to recognize that state-controlled media can serve as a political public relations instrument to promote government-directed communication efforts to shape foreign audiences' views on issues vital to the nation's interests (Zhang et al., 2017).

Baumgartner et al. (2009, cited in 2022) and Vladislavljević (2015, cited in Sun 2022) emphasize that during wartime, governments, even in democratic countries, must strategically manage information and influence public perception to garner popular support, which is essential for the legitimacy of their political objectives. In authoritarian countries, mainstream articles suggest that authoritarian regimes possess the ability to influence strategic framing, dictating the information that is largely accessible to the public.

*f) Framing Theory*

To understand the performance of state-owned media during wartime, it is necessary to explain some media theories that function automatically in such crises. Goffman's 1974 concept of Frame Analysis explains how information is presented to the audience in a manner that is referred to as "the frame", shaping their choices and decisions based on the framing of the message (Farid, 2024). Framing is significant because it "extends beyond mere theoretical discussion; it has profound implications for public discourse, policy formulation, and social movements" (Song, 2024, p. 1).

According to the theory, frames are abstractions that increase the meaning or interpretation of a message. They are employed to depict the media's position on the reported material and to facilitate the explication of media communication (Abiodun & Nwaoboli, 2023).

## METHODOLOGY

This research adopts a qualitative strategy. Qualitative strategy is a research approach that aims to generate in-depth insights into specific topics, utilizing an interpretivist epistemology that seeks to understand the social world through the interpretation of its participants (Clark et al., 2021). The ontology in qualitative strategy is constructionist, and it implies that social properties are outcomes of interactions between individuals, rather than phenomena "out there" (Clark et

al., 2021). This strategy directly supports the main objective of the research by providing a comprehensive framework for gaining a deeper understanding of the underlying narratives behind the broadcast content. Emphasizing an interpretive epistemology and a constructionist ontology, the project acknowledges the importance of Télé Liban discourse in shaping national unity among Lebanese citizens, particularly during times of war.

The research methodology will integrate discourse analysis of Télé Liban news bulletins' headlines, allowing for the discovery of the official television's agenda. As defined by Fairclough (2023), critical discourse analysis refers to the study of the connections between language use and the exercise of power; these connections are usually implicit and not recognized by people, thus it requires closer examination to discover the hidden meaning and therefore how language plays a vital role in the workings of power. This paper adopts Norman Fairclough's critical discourse approach, which developed a model consisting of three dimensions: textual analysis, discourse practice, and social practice. In analysing the media discourse, the main focus is on its macro-and microstructure, not only to explain the hidden meaning, but also to identify that discourse (Fairclough, 2023). Analysis of text is concerned with its meanings and its forms, where forms necessarily reveal meanings. Language is constitutive in conventional manners that facilitate the reproduction and maintenance of existing social identities, relationships, and systems of knowledge and belief, as well as in creative ones that aid in their transformation (Fairclough, 2023).

As this media discourse considers the headlines of Télé Liban news bulletins and applies Fairclough's approach, it aims to answer the following question, how did Télé Liban report the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon through specific lexical choices, and what do these choices reveal about its positioning as a state media?" In this discourse analysis, news headlines from Télé Liban will be analysed based on Fairclough's approach and hence the focus will be on the lexical choices to uncover the hidden meaning and interpret how each headline is framed. Under the umbrella of purposive sampling, this study adopted a criterion sampling type in which four news bulletins were selected using purposive sampling, and 19 headlines were analysed. A table for every news bulletin was done, which contains the English translation of the headline, from Arabic, in good faith. Table 1 includes the significant lexical choices used, the frame inferred, and a brief explanation of the lexical choices used.

Regarding the frames, they were selected based on the context of the analysis and the meaning conveyed, such as power, nationalism, humanitarian, state responsibility, and others. The conclusions of this study are not based solely on the analysis of these specific headlines; rather, they are the results of observing 15 news bulletins from Télé Liban, which contributes to reaching more accurate conclusions.

## FINDINGS

Before the analysis and the presenting the findings, Table 1 summarises the samples taken from Télé Liban's news bulletins and lists the number of headlines summarized from each news bulletin.

Table 1: Samples for discourse analysis taken from Télé Liban

Date of the News Bulletin	The Reason Behind Sampling It	Number of Headlines
28-09-2025	On this date, the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah was announced. This event affected many Lebanese people, and hence it is essential to study how Télé Liban framed this event.	5
02-11-2024	On this date, the Israeli army conducted a naval landing on the beach of the Batroun area in Lebanon and kidnapped a Lebanese person. This incident is a violation of Lebanese sovereignty from the sea. Therefore, the study of Télé Liban's framing of this Israeli breach is necessary.	4
26-11-2024	This date marked preceded the implementation of the ceasefire, and hence the study of the media discourse of Télé Liban during this time is significant because it contributes to the understanding of the discursive practice of the Lebanese official discourse in the final moments of the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon and after the success of diplomatic efforts.	6
27-11-2024	This news bulletin dates back to the day when the displaced Lebanese returned to their villages and homes after the ceasefire came into force. It is a quintessential national day; therefore, observing Télé Liban's engagement with this event reveals the channel's agenda in responding to a major national day.	4

After identifying the samples selected for this study, Table 2 extracts the lexical choices and frames of the headlines of the first news bulletin from Télé Liban selected for analysis.

Table 2: Lexical choices, and frames of the headline of the news bulletin on 28 September 2024

Headlines (in Arabic)	English Translation	Lexical Choices	Frames
سيد المقاومة، حسن نصر الله، شهيداً على طريق القدس وفلسطين	Master of Resistance, Hassan Nasrullah, martyred on the path to Al-Quds and Palestine.	Master of Resistance, martyred, on the path, Al-Quds and Palestine	Martyrdom Frame
الغارات متواصلة على الضاحية بعد العدوان الهامي خلال الساعات الماضية، مخلّفاً شهداء وجرحى ودماراً مخيفاً	Airstrikes continue on Dahieh [southern district of Beirut] following the barbaric aggression in recent hours, causing martyrs, injuries, and horrifying destruction.	Airstrikes, barbaric aggression, martyrs, injuries, horrifying destruction	Unnamed actor frame/fear/powerlessness
حزام ناري يلف لبنان من الجنوب إلى البقاع مروراً بجبل لبنان	A belt of fire surrounds Lebanon from the South to the Bekaa, passing through Mount Lebanon.	Belt of fire, surrounds, from...to, passing through	Unnamed actor frame/ Nationalism frame
عمليات نوعية للمقاومة رداً على وحشية العدو	Strategic operations by the Resistance in response to the enemy's brutality.	Strategic, Resistance, in response to, enemy's brutality	Defensive frame/Power Frame vs. Criminality Frame

عدد النازحين الإجمالي بلغ مليون شخص تقريباً و250 ألفاً منهم لجأوا إلى مراكز الإيواء، وهذا العدد مرجح للارتفاع	The total number of [Lebanese] displaced people has reached nearly one million, with 250,000 of them sought refuge in relief centres, a number expected to rise.	Displaced people, sought refuge, relief centres, expected to rise	Humanitarian/state responsibility
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Télé Liban replicated the Islamic Resistance’s media statements as observed in the first headline, as shown in Table 2 of the news bulletin on 28 September 2024. The use of the expression “Sayyed of the Resistance” reflects the symbolic stature of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah not only as a leader of Resistance in Lebanon but as a figurehead for Resistance movements in the Middle East. The term “Resistance” was not geographically confined, which contributes to a broader symbolic representation. Moreover, the phrase “martyred on the road to Al-Quds” carries multiple layers of meaning. The first is its implicit reference to the actor: the use of the term ‘martyr’ implies that he was killed in the noble struggle for the sake of Allah. The phrase “on the road to Al-Quds” signifies the inseparability between the martyrdom of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah and the core cause - that is Palestine.

In this headline in particular, there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that Télé Liban fully adopts the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and does not merely report it. The second possibility is that the channel does not necessarily adopt or endorse the ideological content of the Resistance’s message. In this case, what emerges instead is the absence of a national discourse responding to the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, a figure of substantial symbolic weight within Lebanese territory who was assassinated in an Israeli air raid on September 27, 2024 (Mroue & Lidman, 2024).

In the line of contextualising that provides clarity, the review of the reports included in the news bulletin can be helpful. Télé Liban aired two reports on this topic. The first report included the complete statement from the Military Media of Islamic Resistance of Hezbollah along with footages of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah. This report included terms such as ‘martyr’, ‘fighter’, and ‘killed in a barbaric aggression’. The second report was on the biography of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah and highlighted some of his achievements and the discussion focused further on the political milestones rather than on what related to the Resistance and the defending of the Lebanese territories. Drawing on these reports, it can be observed that the official discourse acknowledges Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah as a “martyr of a barbaric aggression” and a figure with many achievements considering him “a symbol of the Axis of Resistance”. However, these acknowledgments did not frame the discourse within the context that “Nasrullah's martyrdom” is a national event par excellence for a figure with a significant Lebanese symbolism.

In the second headline, Télé Liban depicted the Israeli attacks within a frame that emphasizes their brutality, through terms such as “barbaric aggression” and “horrifying destruction.” However, it failed to clearly and explicitly name the perpetrator; in other words, it did not identify who carried out the “barbaric aggression” against Lebanon. While the aggressor is well known and viewers would automatically understand that the Israeli army is responsible for the airstrikes, the framing of the event as an act of brutality requires explicitly identifying the actor to affirm the legitimacy of the Lebanese stance against the Israeli attacks. The use of the phrase “horrifying destruction” contributed to the reading of the frame of fear, which is



commonly used to describe a status of scare, anxiety, and terror within a specific group of individuals.

The third headline carries direct connotations related to Lebanese national unity. Firstly, it is important to note that Télé Liban, in this headline as well, did not mention the actor, that is, the Israeli enemy, but instead focused on the outcome of its actions, using the term “a belt of fire”. Secondly, the use of the verb ‘surrounds’ followed by “passing through Mount Lebanon” emphasizes that the Israeli attacks do not spare any region, and the Israeli airstrikes are targeting various Lebanese areas. In other words, and in connection with the prevailing social context, the way the headline was phrased contributed to avoiding an exclusive focus on Mount Lebanon. Such a focus might have sparked sectarian tensions by prompting some to blame a specific sect, particularly due to the displacement into those areas, for the attacks. Instead, the headline framed the aggression within a broader context, acknowledging that the Israeli strikes affected all Lebanese regions without exception. Therefore, the fourth headline employs a defensive frame, in addition to the power frame, by presenting Lebanon as being in a position of self-defence, rather than merely a passive recipient of attacks.

Regarding the fifth headline, the presentation of the number of displaced persons, along with the use of the expression “expected to rise” indicates that the issue of displacement was framed by Télé Liban within a humanitarian perspective. This carries multiple implications, especially given that the source is the official state broadcaster. In addition, there is a highly significant implicit meaning in the use of the term “sought refuge”. Linguistically, it connotes seeking protection and safety. The use of this verb about “shelter centres” is particularly important. These centres were established by the Lebanese state during the war, amounting to 1,777 centres across different regions of Lebanon, including schools, universities, and other public institutions (National Council for Scientific Research, 2024).

Thus, the choice of the term “sought refuge”, and the emphasis on it through the mention of the number of people who turned to these centres, posits the state-controlled media as an outlet fulfilling its responsibility toward the displaced people. These displaced individuals, as Lebanese citizens, are shown to be relying on their government. As a result, the headline reflects two frames: first, a humanitarian frame, and second, a state responsibility frame.

Table 3: Lexical choices, and frames of the headline of the news bulletin on 2 November 2024

Headline	English Translation	Lexical Choices	Frames
حدث أمّني في البترون، عملية اختطاف للبناني في إبرار بحري مربّح، وموقع أكسيوس يزعم المعتقل أنّه عضو في القوّ البحريّة لحزب الله	A security incident in Batroun, a kidnapping of a Lebanese in a likely maritime breakthrough, and Axios claims that the detainee is a member of Hezbollah's naval force.	Security incident, Kidnapping, likely maritime breakthrough, detainee	Ambiguity frame/Weakness frame
عمليات نوعية للمقاومة الإسلامية على قواعد صناعات عسكرية للعدو بصليبات صاروخية وقواعد لوجيستية في تل أبيب، حيفا، وعكا	Sophisticated operations by Islamic Resistance on enemy military industrial bases with rocket barrages that hit logistical basements in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Akko.	Sophisticated operations, Islamic resistance, military industrial bases, logistical bases, rocket barrages	Power frame

جيش العدو يزعم الاقتراب من نهاية المرحلة الأولى من العملية البرية في جنوب لبنان بعد شهر من بدئها	The enemy's army claims to approach the end of the first phase of the ground operation in southern Lebanon after a month since its start.	Enemy's army, claims,	Powerlessness/Weakness
خامني: أميركا وإسرائيل ستتلقيان ردًا ساحقًا بسبب مواجهة إيران	Khamenei: America and Israel will receive a crushing response because they are confronting Iran.	Crushing response, confronting Iran	Power frame

Regarding the lexical choices in the first headline of the news bulletin on 02 November 2024, it is noteworthy that Télé Liban describes the operation as "a security incident" without indicating the probable perpetrator. Indeed, at that time, it had not been confirmed that it was an Israeli maritime landing, but the Israeli newspaper Maariv published a report on that day indicating that an Israeli naval force had conducted a landing in the Batroun area and kidnapped a person. However, Télé Liban chose ambiguity and uncertainty. Télé Liban used the term "likely maritime breakthrough" to indicate an act of aggression against Lebanese territory without any reference to the concept of Lebanese territorial sovereignty. The television also resorted to a report from the American Axios website which claims that the abductee is a Hezbollah leader.

Télé Liban also ignored the statement issued by the Minister of Public Works and Transport Ali Hamieh, on the same day, in which he confirmed that the abductee is a cadet at the Maritime Sciences Institute which is a civilian institute in Batroun, and he was kidnapped at morning from his home located just a few meters away from his institution (National News Agency, 2024). It seems that Télé Liban avoided to surpass the Lebanese official authorities regarding the landing operation and consequently avoided to promote news that has not been confirmed by official investigations. It also avoided pointing to the national sovereignty and its violation before official confirmation from Lebanese authorities. Contrary to this reporting practice, Télé Liban did not adopt the same policy when it reported the news from Axios, and hence it did not wait for an official statement from Lebanese authorities after conducting the necessary investigations to explain what happened. This reporting highlights a contradiction in the television's performance; sometimes it does not report to avoid pre-empting the results of the official investigations since it is the public broadcaster, and other times it reports news from an American website that pre-empt the official Lebanese investigations. Moreover, the ambiguity in the terms "likely", in an operation that violated national sovereignty, reflects a weakness in reporting, a political fragmentation within the country after this incident, and uncertainty on what happened. In such a sensitive national incident, the public broadcaster relied on a foreign news source without resorting to national sources.

The term 'sophisticated' in the second headline reflects the television's acknowledgment of the effectiveness and strength of the military actions carried out by the Resistance. The term "Resistance" also reflects the adoption of Télé Liban of the joint ministerial declaration issued by the government of the then Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and included the "right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation, repel its aggressions, and recover the occupied territories". The use of the term "rocket salvo" also indicates that Télé Liban has adopted the media discourse of Islamic Resistance which used the term "rocket salvo" in its statements. As for the term "logistical bases", it also reflects the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

As these terms adopted, Tél  Liban reported the Islamic Resistance's military actions positively because they are not opposing the joint ministerial declaration, and hence it aligned with the media narrative of Islamic Resistance of Hezbollah against the Israeli army.

Regarding the third headline, the use of the term ‘enemy’ also indicates a commitment to the content of the joint Lebanese ministerial statement, which considers Israel an enemy of Lebanon. However, Tél  Liban reused quotes from the Israeli media, namely from platform Kan, such as "approaching" and "the first phase" without any Lebanese oppositional media narrative. The quote "the first phase" reflects the Israeli declared plan of its ground operation against south Lebanon without a reference to the violation of Lebanese sovereignty. Drawing on this passive discursive practice, the noted headline reflects a weakness in the reporting practice and an error of judgment that may propagate the Israeli army media propaganda. In the review of the introductions of Tél  Liban's news bulletins during the period in which the sample was selected for this research, it can be argued that this headline coincided with discussions on the failure of diplomatic efforts and the intention of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to continue waging the war on Lebanon. Therefore, this headline was not linked to the diplomatic efforts to stop the war on Lebanon or Lebanon's official position in supporting diplomacy, which also confirms the absence of a counter-national media narrative.

The fourth headline includes quotes from a speech of the Iranian Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei. In the original text, the idea was presented literally, “The enemies – whether the Zionist entity or the United States – should know that they will certainly face a crushing response for their actions against Iran, its people, and the resistance front” (Kouachi, 2024). Tél  Liban did not include the phrase “resistance front” and this can be in the line of the Lebanese government position to avoid any involvement in any regional conflict waged between Iran and the United States of America or between Iran and Israel.

Table 4: Lexical choices, and frames of the headline of the news bulletin on 26 November 2024

Headline	English Translation	Lexical Choices	Frames
ساعات مفصلية حاسمة... كلمة لبنانيين تنتهيهو عند الثامنة من هذه الليلة بعد اجتماع كابينة العدو	Critical decisive hours... A speech by Benjamin Netanyahu at eight o'clock tonight following the enemy cabinet meeting.	Critical decisive hours	Ambiguity frame/powerlessness frame
العدو يوسع عدوانه على لبنان والتركيز بات على العاصمة بيروت في عمل جنوني واسع النطاق	The enemy expands its aggression on Lebanon, with the focus now on the capital, Beirut, in a wide-scale, frenzied operation.	Expands aggression/focus on the capital/wide scale/frenzied	Aggression/ powerlessness
توحش بالغارات والقصف في ربع الساعة الأخير	Savage intensity in the airstrikes and shelling during the last quarter hour.	Savage intensity/last quarter hour	Aggression/Powerless ness/fear/invisibility of the enemy frame
استهداف مناطق عدة وبالونات حرارية فوق السراي الحكومي	Targeting of multiple areas and flares over the Grand Serail.	Targeting/multiple areas	Neutral frame/invisibility of the enemy frame

The news bulletin on 26 November 2024 was aired before the day of the ceasefire came into force. Tél  Liban highlighted in its headline, as shown in Table 4, the anticipated speech of

the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It started the headline with the phrase, "Decisive and critical hours". This phrase carries the meaning of waiting and anticipation for something to be resolved. In the same headline, Télé Liban chose to announce Netanyahu's speech in a regular news manner. Indeed, Télé Liban did not acknowledge the anticipation of Netanyahu's speech, but the structure of the headline in that way indicates the significance of the speech, its impact, and the necessity to follow it up. The use of this syntactic structure carries a negative connotation. As it suggests, anticipation is on what the Israelis will say regarding the announcement of a ceasefire. The use of the term "decisive turning point" in pointing to Netanyahu's speech places the Lebanese viewers within the frame of ambiguity until the time of Netanyahu's speech that will unravel the existing uncertainty.

In the remaining headlines of the news bulletin, Télé Liban framed the Israeli army's attacks on Lebanon as criminal actions. It described the Israeli army's actions against Lebanon as "savagery in the raids and bombardment" and pointed that the Israeli army wants to end the war with 'brutality' and 'bloodshed'. However, in its fourth headline, Télé Liban channel chose to be solely informative in reporting the news, referring to the Israeli attacks on multiple areas and the flares over the Grand Serail. Yet, it omitted the actor, namely, the Israeli army, from this headline as well.

However, the lack of any report of an operation led by Islamic Resistance on that day frames the final scene of the war within a narrative caused by the Israeli army such as, 'brutal', 'bloody', and 'savage', without any reference to any Resistance action in the headlines.

Table 5: Lexical choices, and frames of the headline of the news bulletin on 27 November 2024

Headline	English Translation	Lexical Choices	Frames
سيل بشري على طرقات لبنان...آلاف النازحين يعودون إلى مناطقهم بعد دخول وقف إطلاق النار حيز التنفيذ الرابعة فجرا	A human flood on Lebanon's roads... Thousands of displaced people return to their villages after the ceasefire came into force at 4 a.m.	Human flood/return to their regions/after the ceasefire came into force	Power frame/ Legitimacy frame/ Diplomatic Resolution frame
الجيش يبشر تعزيز انتشاره في قطاع جنوب الليطاني والرئيس بري طالب بالإسراع بانتخاب رئيس للجمهورية	The army begins reinforcing its deployment in the South Litani sector, and President Berri called for expediting the election of a President.	Reinforcing its deployment/ expediting the Presidential election/	Legitimacy frame
الرئيس ميقاتي: اليوم تبدأ مسيرة الألف ميل لإعادة الإعمار وملتزمون تطبيق القرار 1701	President Mikati: Today, the journey of a thousand miles for reconstruction begins, and we are committed to implementing Resolution 1701.	Journey of a thousand miles for reconstruction begins/committed/ implementing/ resolution 1701	Diplomatic Resolution frame
لودريان في بيروت هذا المساء واجتماع مرتقب للخماسية في قصر الصنوبر	Le Drian in Beirut this evening, and a meeting of the Quintet is expected at the Pine Palace.	Le Drian in Beirut/ a meeting of the Quintet is expected	Diplomatic Resolution frame

The first headline of the news bulletin on 27 November 2024, as shown in Table 5, reflects the Lebanese reactions after the ceasefire came into force. Télé Liban used the term "a human

flood”, then reinforced it by stating “thousands of displaced people return” which effectively reflects the strength of the Lebanese people after the declaration of the ceasefire. The use of the term “their villages” indicates the legitimacy of the return of the displaced Lebanese, as they are returning to their villages, which they belong to, and no one has the right to prevent them from returning.

In the second headline *Télé Liban* chose to frame the strength of the Lebanese official stance and the Lebanese people within a broader context that emphasizes the success of diplomatic efforts, rather than within a frame highlighting the victory of the Resistance in Lebanon. In other words, *Télé Liban* portrayed in the beginning of the headline a scene of return, the legitimacy of return, and the strength of the Lebanese people after a fierce war. However, *Télé Liban* placed this scene in the context of the implementation of the ceasefire that reached after diplomatic efforts and did not place it within the frame of the Resistance’s victory in Lebanon after intense battles between the Resistance and the Israeli army.

The remaining headlines in this bulletin confirm *Télé Liban*’s framing of the return of the displaced and the end of the war within the context of the success of diplomatic efforts. The second headline also reflects strength in the Lebanese stance, as *Télé Liban* used the phrase “begins reinforcing its deployment” about the Lebanese Army redeploying in the south Litani area in southern Lebanon. Thus, this headline reflected the strength of the official Lebanese political position, represented by the extension of the Lebanese Army’s existence in that area.

As for the second part of this headline, in which *Télé Liban* conveyed a segment from a speech of Lebanese Speaker Nabih Berri, delivered on the day the Lebanese returned to their villages after the ceasefire came into force. The salience of this particular phrase of Berri’s speech was at the expense of other statements of the Speaker on Lebanese heroism and victory (Al Mayadeen English, 2024). The third headline also portrayed the scene of that day, pointing toward reconstruction and rebuilding files after a 66-day war, in addition to reaffirming Lebanon’s commitment to the outcomes of the successful diplomatic effort, namely, the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1701. These quotes were from a speech delivered by the then Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati who also called on Israel to withdraw from the territories it had entered and to abide by the provisions of the ceasefire. The selection of this specific part of Prime Minister Mikati’s speech, at the expense of other positions, reflected a tendency to direct attention toward the reconstruction and rebuilding file. However, the air of an excerpt from Mikati’s speech that called on Israel to withdraw reflected a strong Lebanese official stance.

The final headline points to the visit of the French President’s envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian to Lebanon in order to follow up on the political crisis due to the then prolonged presidential vacuum. As a result, *Télé Liban* reported the news of the diplomatic efforts to resolve that national issue and hence it framed that event in the line of diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the presidential crisis and end it by electing a Lebanese President.

## CONCLUSION

This study reached significant findings through the discourse analysis conducted on the headlines of four news bulletins and the review of 15 news bulletins aired on Télé Liban. It became evident that the channel adhered to the Lebanese ministerial statement, which identifies Israel as an enemy and affirms the legitimacy of the Resistance. This was reflected in its consistent use of terms such as “the Israeli enemy” and “the Resistance.”

The study also revealed a clear focus in Télé Liban’s discourse on diplomatic activity and diplomatic efforts, aligning with the official Lebanese discourse, which seeks assistance from foreign countries and prioritizes diplomatic channels.

Furthermore, the analysis noted the omission of the actor in some headlines, that is, the action (such as Israeli aggression) was mentioned, but the actor (the Israeli army) was absent from the headline.

Additionally, it was observed that the channel often included figures issued by the Ministry of Public Health, specifically regarding the number of martyrs and wounded, in the first headline of the bulletin across several of the monitored samples.

Drawing on all of the analysis, it can be concluded that during the Israeli war of 2024 on Lebanon, Télé Liban adopted a discourse marked by clarity in its stance, particularly in framing the Israeli army and its action and in framing the Resistance and its actions. However, Télé Liban discourse did not pay attention to the role of the public broadcaster to emphasize and enhance national unity among the Lebanese people.

#### BIODATA

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