

## Media Framing of the Israeli Arabic - Speaking Social Media Pages Directed to the Palestinian Audience

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### ABSTRACT

In recent years, Facebook and social media, in general, have become an essential and critical platform for Israel to direct its daily messages to all Arabs in general and the Palestinian audience in particular as part of its new digital diplomacy to polish its image among the Palestinian FB users. The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian land made Israel an oppressor state that the Palestinians consider the enemy. Since Israel cares about its public image and hopes to normalise this occupation, it attempted to directly exploit social media to interact with people via modern technology. This qualitative study attempted to analyse four official Israeli official Facebook pages in Arabic, namely '*Avichay Adrae*,' '*the Coordinator*,' '*ofir Gendelman*,' and '*Israel Speaks Arabic*,' which are primarily directed toward the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and the Arabs in the Middle East, generally. The study collected Facebook posts for 11 months, from February to December 2019, and conducted a content analysis on these pages. The results exhibited in these pages adopted several media frames and strategies to attract and positively influence the Palestinian audience to change their image towards the occupation, become a more cultural and civilised entity, and normalise the occupation as a goal.

**Keywords:** *Social media, Facebook, Palestinian-Israeli struggle, framing news, Palestinian image.*

### INTRODUCTION

Media has become the most prominent representation of states, organisations, and institutions in this digital world, whether international or local. Hence, the Ministry of Media or Information is fundamental for the renaissance of countries that cannot be dispensed with or are neglected (Kampf, Manor, & Segev, 2015). However, the occupied state of Israel decided not to have an official ministry for media, but to establish a media division in each Ministry or government department with a media spokesperson and assistants. Their role is to plan statements and reactions professionally and only to the public. Besides that, the State Media Department and the Journalists' Association regulate the relationship between the authorities and the media (Abu Tabak, 2007). This method of managing media materials gives Israeli institutions a more significant opportunity to be free from government restrictions and from following a single media direction. It also enabled it to strengthen its communication networks with the Arab and international world more flexibly and modernly.

Today, Palestinians are experiencing an awareness crisis in dealing with the Israeli occupation considering the complicated political and security conditions in the Arab reality, the lack of confidence in the ruling political systems and movements, and the openness and cooperation situation between "Israel" and several Arab countries in the political, media, security, and economics fields. This situation was reflected in the significant divergence in the political positions of the Palestinian and Arab public regarding their status toward the Israeli

occupation. That led to the emergence of new features in the Arab region and created a normalised relationship based on distorted facts that Israeli social media has been using to manage its policy and messages. Hence, it seems complicated to understand the precise dimensions of Israeli social media without understanding the general Israeli national and subsidiary goals. There is a high correlation between Israeli media work and those goals. This paper focuses only on the Israeli Arabic Facebook pages directed towards the Palestinians, namely 'the coordinator' and 'Avichay Adraee. Henceforth, the research questions posed for this study are; i)What are the most prominent topics the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages cover related to Palestinian issues?, ii)What are the news frames deal with news of the Palestinian issues in Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages? , iii) What are the salient elements used in news frames about the Palestinian issues on Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages?, iv) What are effective solution frames Israeli Arabic-language Facebook sites offer on the conflict?

## RESEARCH BACKGROUND

### *The Israeli Digital Media and Diplomacy*

Digital diplomacy is defined as a form of public diplomacy. Social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, communicate with the outside public at no cost (Bjola & Holmes, 2015). In what Potter (2002) defines as a basis for diplomatic practices done digitally, through electronic networks, the Internet, mobile devices, and social communication channels, with the public in a way that stirs public opinion in favour of those pursuing this policy. According to the Digital Strategy Report issued by the U.K. Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2013), direct communication with civil society, governments, and influential individuals can be expanded through the Internet.

As for the most prominent goals of digital diplomacy, according to Abdelal (2018), there are seven goals. To act in the national interest and increase their soft power at the first level. Second, to interact with civil society, especially Opinion leaders in other countries. Third, influencing the external dimension and periphery of the country and sending messages addressed to it. The fourth is to achieve public rapprochement psychologically and socially with other people and manage them at no cost. Fifth, representing and caring for the country's interests in other countries. Sixth, providing security and intelligence information to the authorities. Finally, seventh employs the science of social engineering in social networking sites, which weaken people's convictions by studying their psychological characteristics and providing acceptable media content.

On Israeli digital diplomacy, Abdelal (2018) indicated that Israel moved from eighth place in the world in 2016 to fourth place in 2018 in diplomacy. Digital realised that complicated tools have proven their failure in resolving the conflict with the Arabs and that the hope is to exploit their soft power. He also linked the increase in Internet usage rates and social networks in the Arab world and Israel's pursuit of more access to these users to influence them, as the Arab world is inhabited by more than 280 million Arabs, of whom 145 million use the Internet, and 100 A million users use Facebook, as well as other social networks, such as Twitter, Instagram, Snap chat and others. Most of these users are young people.

The Israeli digital media runs to serve particular goals by the Israeli media establishment. It attempts to harness all the technological tools and media platforms to mobilise the world to increase the pro-Israeli sentiments and narratives (Aouragh, 2016). These goals range from weaving relationships with Arab societies through frameworks

beyond official methods to developing these relationships with no issues to disturb them. Such relations would lead to a clear normalisation framework. From this framework, digital diplomacy became an integral part of the Israeli media.

Another factor contributing to Israel's focus on digital diplomacy is its discovery of the role of social networking sites in mobilising the youth during the Arab Spring revolutions. This has pushed the Arab youth instead of Arab regimes and used digital diplomacy instead of public diplomacy. Exploiting virtual reality on the Internet will influence their minds (Rotem, 2018). Therefore, Israel could achieve a quantum leap in digital diplomacy ahead of Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, and Sweden, countries with a particular interest in digital diplomacy, between 2016 and 2018.

In her report, Haroush (2017) indicated that in 2011 Israel established a department specialised in digital diplomacy. One of its primary responsibilities is to plan and publish messages on social media to enable it to increase the audience and deepen communication with them. There is a special section for the Arabic language in this department directly affiliated with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is managed by Yonatan Gonen. One of its most prominent speakers is Hasan Kaaba. According to Rotem (2018), this section aims to improve the image of Israel and highlight its cultural, human, and artistic character to the Arab public, as well as convey aspects of life inside Israel, stressing technological and technical excellence, ways of coexistence, and equality, women's rights, and areas of democracy and tolerance.

#### *The Israeli Media and the Unity of Ideology*

Since its inception, one idea that has ruled Israeli thought is complete security and military control, from inside to the periphery. Therefore, everything that came out of this thought served and strengthened this idea. Bar-ilan, Bronstein and Aharony (2013) Stated that the Zionist ideology ruled the Israeli state, the parties resulting from it, and its media discourse. Hence, it was natural for the leaders and parties to move from one party to another without affecting the public discourse promoting Zionism. This concept is that Israel is the national home of the world's Jews, and it is driven from the Talmudic biblical thought, whereby it gives priority to Israeli security and its preservation, the dissemination and deepening of the Jewish heritage, and the strengthening of the Hebrew language, compared to other languages spoken by Jewish immigrants.

As for the ideology of the Israeli media regarding the Palestinians, Abu-Amer (2018) indicates several observations about how this media operates, especially concerning its orientation towards Palestinian issues and developments. First, it is a security guard in its principles and objectives, directed, controlled, and monitored by the military security circles. Second, it is essential and complementary at the same time. It is a department dealing with the Arab public that is completely exposed to it. It is a follower of and complementary to foreign policy, supporting its work in promoting Israel's propaganda and fighting anyone that criticizes Israel in the world.

Abu-Amer (2018) identified seven specifications for the Zionist ideological trends served by the Israeli media, considering that these trends or media specifications have not changed regardless of events or developments related to the Palestinian issue. These trends are: First, all Jews are part of the one Jewish nation, and it is necessary to bring them together in Palestine to establish a Jewish state. Second, maintaining the security and survival of Israel is a priority; nevertheless, the mechanism for defending its survival differs from time to time.

Third, emphasising the historicity and entitlement of the Jewish presence in Palestine in exchange for neglecting Palestinian history, its marginalisation, and denial; fourth, shattering the Palestinian national identity and tampering with its relationship with the Arab identity. Fifth, consider the Palestinians an indefinite human group and recognise their right to form an entity or self-determination. Sixth, Israel is an oasis of Western democracy in a backward and dictatorial Arab world. Seventh, recalling the Nazi genocide of the Jews and their continued use as a justification for the oppression and displacement of the Palestinians and silencing the Western world's voice demanding justice.

### *Israel and Facebook*

Facebook is the most prominent tool of Israeli digital diplomacy and the most used and visible in recent years, compared to radio and television, which have declined in favour of electronic and social media. If the competition is raging between Facebook and Twitter, the occupation state has not stood on the side of one against the other. Nonetheless, Israel sought to take advantage of the available scope for each of them, as well as the anticipated audience, and to broaden the frontiers of communication with her beyond the geographical or physical boundaries that prevented her message from being broadcast via television or radio (Kampf et al., 2015). The Arabic-speaking Israeli pages were launched on social media, in general, at a very early stage. Still, they gained more attention on Facebook because it allowed users to write blogs, posts, and comments without specifying the number of characters, as is the case with Twitter. In addition, Facebook allows for sharing multimedia and correspondence directly with those responsible for the pages or the audience.

The Facebook company was lenient with the pressures of the occupation state to fight Palestinian resistance by closing countless Palestinian pages under various pretexts. The Israeli Ministry of Justice revealed that Facebook had responded to more than 85% of Israel's requests to remove, prohibit, and provide data on Palestinian content on the social networking site. In September 2016, the Facebook administration signed an agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Justice, requiring monitoring of Palestinian content on social media. Pages and personal accounts (Al-Safadi, 2018). In the first six months of 2018, the Facebook administration removed 60 Palestinian accounts "against the background of postings against the Israeli occupation and its crimes" (Aljazeera, 2018).

### *Avichay Adraee's Facebook Page*

As for the administration of the Arabic propaganda sector in the Israeli army, it was taken over by Major Avichay Adraee 11 years ago. Adraee belongs to a Syrian Jewish family of Dir'iya, who left Syria decades ago. He was born in 1982, speaks Arabic fluently, and is well acquainted with Arab culture, formerly in the Military Intelligence 'Aman' division (Fathi, 2014).

The most crucial goal of Adraee's presence on the Arabic communication sites is to strive to give a humane character to the officers and soldiers of the Israeli army. He indicates he is trying to achieve this goal by appearing in military uniform and behaving humanely, such as eating Egyptian food and other activities to change the preconceived perceptions of the army by the Arabic audience (Al-Akhras, 2018). Adraee stresses that the Israeli military was keen to develop technical and programmatic temptations that would enhance the chances of Arab citizens being attracted to their accounts on social media. According to Khalifa (2017), Adraee's account is one of the most famous personal accounts on social media, with followers

on Facebook exceeding one million and 200,000 fans of the page, and more than nine thousand followers on Twitter, since its accession in 2011.

Israeli departments have created many pages on Facebook to spread Israeli propaganda and open lines for communication with the Palestinian and Arab public. Despite the significant number of Israeli Arabic-speaking pages on Facebook, most of the officers of the Coordination and Intelligence Committees have opened their pages to address the Palestinian and Arab public. All 24 ministers in the Israeli government have Facebook pages bearing their real names directed to the Arab people (Mualla, 2017). However, there are a few pages that have revealed its influence. It has become the talk of the Arab and Palestinian streets because of the method it presents and the material it proposes. The most prominent of which was the page of the Coordinator, Israel in Arabic, and the page of Avichay Adraee, And Ofir Gendelman. This study will only analyse two pages addressing the Palestinians, the Coordinator, and Avichay Adraee.

#### *The Al-Munaseq Facebook Page*

The *Almunaseq*, meaning in English 'the coordinator,' is considered an actual ruler of the Palestinian people. The Israeli Civil Administrator, Major General Yoav Mordechai, created a Facebook page in 2016; the page is the Coordinator of Government Activities to address the Palestinian people. The page shares their security lectures, transmitting various statements; and calling them to visit the offices of the Civil Administration directly to obtain new permits, cancel the security ban, and travel between the West Bank and Gaza and to Israel in a clear and direct violation of the role of the Palestinian Authority.

A short review of the *Almunaseq* page shows the extent to which the Civil Administration interferes in the lives of the Palestinians whom the authority is supposed to rule. For this reason, the page established at the end of March 2016 has become a service nature, as it defines itself as seeking to follow up on the civil procedures and services provided by the Israeli side. Today, more than 120,000 people follow the page. The Coordinator spares no effort to respond to inquiries and invites the Palestinian public to write to him privately to meet his needs while hiding the reality of his role in recruiting youth (Zaboun, 2017).

#### *Ofir Gendelman's Facebook Page*

Israeli institutions have launched official accounts in Arabic for them on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. The most crucial human component in this effort is Ofir Gendelman's Page, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Arabic spokesperson, who conveys Netanyahu's positions and explains them to the Arab public through social media (Al-Naami, 2017).

Gendelman is keen on conveying Netanyahu's congratulations to the Arab world on the holidays, as well as informing the Arab public about the political and diplomatic activities in which he participates, noting that he rarely uses "hostile" language to explain the prime minister's positions (Khalaf, 2016).

#### *Israel Speaks Arabic*

It is the official Arabic page for Israel on Facebook, launched by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Facebook as information about the State of Israel (Khalifa, 2017). This page is considered the most professional in publishing news that significantly beautifies the image of Israel. The page focuses mainly on relations between Israel and the Arab countries to prove that the Zionist entity is part of the region and that the Arab countries have no problem

cooperating with Israel, as the publications highlight the cultural ties between Israel and the Arab countries, including the welcome of Egyptian artists to broadcast the series. Al-Masrya on Israeli channels, as did the Israeli Arabic-language Channel 33 (Matoug, 2015).

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs celebrated the page's arrival with more than a million likes during the recent period. However, the Interaction of the Arab public, mainly from Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan, does not reflect an admiration for Israel or what is published on the page. Instead, the comments of Arab surfers indicate they do not take these publications seriously. It is interesting to note here that Cairo is one of the most popular cities on the page, and the age group that is most popular with it ranges from 18 to 24 years (Al-hussini, 2019).

#### PROBLEM STATEMENT

A critical review of the Arabic-speaking Israeli social media pages indicates that it has become a field based on excitement, brainwashing, and manipulating emotions. They are no longer just ideas or statements; but are based on a pre-set agenda that includes goals, tools, stages, intellectual logic, evidence, and coherent arguments. Therefore, they are directing their followers to change their attitudes and perceptions about the occupation and the principles of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Mualla, 2017). The Arabic-speaking Israeli electronic media pages are considered an essential link in the series of episodes controlling the relationship with the Palestinians. Their mission is to dictate specific positions on the central issues in the public street after framing them and obtaining security approval.

With the significant development witnessed by the Israeli social media and the entry of the Arabic-speaking Israeli websites into daily discussions and political affairs, especially those related to the Palestinians, it has become noticeable that these pages focus on the day-to-day life issues of all Israeli and Palestinian citizen (Stein, 2012). Therefore, the issues of concern to the Palestinians, which are considered among the basics of their national identity, have become the subject of discussion, controversy, bidding, and articulation, after there were red lines that could not be dealt with, even if the media affiliated with the Authorities or the occupation and its European allies were promoting it. In this context, the study seeks to analyse the nature of the media framing formed by the Israeli Facebook pages in Arabic directed toward the Palestinians through their coverage of-Palestinian issues.

#### METHODOLOGY

This study is considered a descriptive-analytical study. It analyses all the topics on the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages directed at the Palestinians, namely '*the 'Almunaseq,' 'Avichay Adraae,' 'Ofir Gendelman', and 'Israel Speaks Arabic.'*' The study employs the content analysis method of the specified Facebook pages. Content analysis is considered the most suitable scientific method for descriptive studies. It is a practical, systematic effort to obtain data, information, and descriptions of the phenomenon to gain complete insight into the aspects of the situation. The content analysis approach has been adopted to describe the subject and form of topics covered by these Facebook pages to understand their quality and quantity to answer the questions of the study.

The study also employs a purposive sampling approach for the data collection, as the timeline for this study extends for eleven months, from May 2019 to March 2020. The study aims to list all the materials that accompanied the most prominent occasions and events during this period. Two weeks of the month of 5/2019 attended the coverage of Nakba, or so-called "the Independence Day of Israel," and the transportation of The American embassy to Jerusalem. A week from January 2020 involved the announcement of the American Century

deal. A week from march 2020 involved the repercussions of the spread of the coronavirus in the occupied territories.

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study employed Framing Theory as the theoretical framework. Frames are patterns of interpretation through which people classify information to handle it efficiently. While Goffman (1974) defines a media frame as a specific construction of expectations that the media uses to make people more aware of social situations at some point, it is; therefore, a targeted process by the communicator when he reorganises the message so that it falls into the category of people's perceptions and persuasive influences.

The frame may be performed by choosing specific contexts and vocabulary to describe the event, whether by intimidation or underestimation. Moreover, it may be added, deleted, distorted, or allowed to mention specific details—but not others; this represents a point of view so specific that what information is received is what the journalist desires, not necessarily what happened in reality. This may affect the public's understanding and judgment of this event (Auerbach & Bloch-Elkon, 2005). The journalist relies on a frame of reference for selecting and drafting news and focuses on these frames to highlight specific aspects of the news and obscures other elements to appear accurate. Still, it is not complete (Mark Miller, 1997).

#### *Types of News Frame*

Although journalists differ in how they write the news, specific frames control these different formats when discussing the types of news frames. Previous literature has identified a handful of commonly occurring frames in the news. Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) discussed various types of frames in U.S. news coverage: conflict, economic consequences, human impact, and morality.

Based on these frames, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) analysed five national newspapers and television news stories in the period surrounding the Amsterdam meeting of European heads of state in 1997. They identified five predominant news frames: attribution of responsibility, conflict, economics, human interest, and morality.

1. Human interest frame: This frame "brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem." During times of crisis, the frame stimulates the psychological pulse of people, which ultimately leads them to have a more negative attitude toward the situation.
2. Conflict frame: It is used in such a way as to reflect conflict and disagreement among individuals, groups, or organisations. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) mention that the conflict frame was the second most common frame, and the more serious the newspaper, the more the conflict frame was in evidence.
3. Morality frame: This frame puts the event and problem in the context of morals, social prescriptions, and religious tenets.
4. Economic consequences frame: This frame reports an event, problem, or issue in terms of the consequences that it will have on an individual, group, organisation, or country. The vast impact is a substantial news value, and the economic consequences are often considerable (Graber, 1993).

5. Attribution of responsibility frame: This frame is defined as "a way of attributing responsibility for [a] cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group" (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 96).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### *Descriptive Findings*

Significantly, the numbers have been calculated based on the total number of posts rather than the number of contents, as multiple contents are occasionally encompassed in a single post. However, the findings of the content category, as seen in Table 1, demonstrate that the distinct orientations of the media contents vary enormously. *The military doctrine* scored the highest overall percentage with 23.7%, followed by *coexistence and peace with* 22.8%. Though both categories represent contradictory orientations, the score difference is relatively slight. This indicates that the language of media content is partially peaceful and partially warlike.

Table 1: Media contents and issues of Israeli Arabic-speaking social media pages

Media Content	Total	Percentage
Security Doctrine and Deterrence Power	541	23.71%
Coexistence and Peace	521	22.8%
Religious Interaction	240	10.5%
Cultural Interaction (art, music, literature)	303	13.3%
Extermination and the Holocaust	57	2.5%
Political Diplomacy	291	12.8%
Technological Superiority	190	8.3%
Military Superiority	300	13.1%
Women and Child Affairs	71	3.1%
Internal Arab Affairs	156	6.8%
Calling the public for Interaction	334	14.6%
Documenting daily life in the Occupation State	283	12.4%
Impersonation of the Language and Heritage Contents	195	8.5%
Manipulation of the Relationship between the Arab and Islamic Regions	252	11.0%
Questioning the Resistance	402	17.6%
Historical Claim of the Jewish Existence in Palestine	156	6.8%
Human Rights	11	0.5%
The Non-Jewish Population of the Occupation state	168	7.4%
The Jewish People	167	7.3%
Language and Religion	77	3.4%
War Scenarios	98	4.3%
Tourist Openness	83	3.6%

Nevertheless, the Israeli media discourse is still driven by the military orientation and features of force and conflict. It was found that *questioning the resistance* scored 17.6%, and 13% was given to the *military superiority* category. These percentages together represent 54.4% of the total portion of media content. The religious Interaction that shows religious ceremonies scored 10%, whereas *the cultural exchange* that sheds light on art, music, and literature accounts for 13%. The language and religion as media content were given 3% in the same context.

Among the advanced percentages were political diplomacy, which scored 12.8%, and *calling on the public for Interaction*, which was 14.6%. Concerning the contents related to the Palestinian national identity, *questioning the resistance* was top-placed, followed respectively by *documenting life in the occupation state*, *manipulation of the relationship between the*



*Arab and Islamic regions, impersonation of the language and heritage contents, and finally, the historical claim of the Jewish existence in Palestine.* These contents will be further explored in the section on its relationship with the components of national identity.

To sum up, it is noteworthy that media content reflects opposite orientations in handling issues. On the one hand, there is an inclination towards adopting force and deterrence, security doctrine, military superiority, and questioning the resistance. There are calls for coexistence, peace, religious and cultural Interaction, common issues between the language and religion, and for the public to interact and express their views to trigger their perceptions or even stir up their provocation towards relevant issues. Such a subconscious-based approach constitutes a cornerstone in dealing with the enemy.

### *Media Framing*

As shown in table 2, concerning media frameworks, *human interests* ranked first with a percentage of 29.5%. This framework concerns the dramatic and influential formulation of media messages and content in a humanitarian context. The conflict frame dealing with force and war ranks second with 26.8%, followed by the moral frame scoring 15.9%, *social responsibility* scoring 14.8%, and *the economic frame* scoring 13%. The results showed that these frames should win people's hearts and use peace-war methods to link relations between the occupation and the Arab and Palestinian people.

Table 2: Media frames of Israeli Arabic-speaking social media pages

<b>Media Frames</b>	<b>Number of posts</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Human Interests Frame	673	29.5%
Conflict Frame	612	26.8%
Moral Frame	362	15.9%
Economic Frame	298	13.1%
Social Responsibility frame	337	14.8%
<b>Total posts</b>	<b>2282</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

However, it is worth noting that the conflict frames were used only about the occupier's relationship with the Palestinian resistance factions, Hezbollah and Iran, or peaceful boycott movements. The occupation used a different speech content between the nonpartisan Palestinians and Arabs and the parties opposed to the occupation.

The speech content directed to the "peaceful" Arab and Palestinians followed economic frames such as economic advantages, benefits, and future economic projects. Besides, it followed human-interest frames like shedding light on human and emotional stories and showing sympathy for the Arab world's issues and concerns. Also, the moral frame showed the occupation seeking to help the elderly, children, women, and the sick.

The Israeli media uses the social responsibility frame to blame the victim for confiscating rights or land theft. The threat was used to push Palestinians to stop supporting any counter-action to the occupation state; otherwise, this might jeopardise their economic and humanitarian situation, kill their children, or cause their homes to be demolished and their property confiscated. It is a sort of "false consciousness" that the victims believe they would be responsible for the aggressor's grabbing of their intellectual and material rights.

### Elements of News Frames

According to Table 3, a photo from the event scene ranked first with 28%, whereas a video scored 22%, so there is a big difference between these two percentages and the rest of the focus items that did not exceed 10%. Accordingly, these findings indicate that the focus on videos shows that the Israeli social media makers give much concern to videos, motion, music, graphics, and spoken words; as the role of these media a more significant influence on the viewers than static pictures, to them intellectually and socially. It also has a feature to count the number of views, unlike posts or photos.

Table 3: Salient elements employed in news frames of Israeli Arabic-speaking social media pages

Salient elements	Number of Posts	Percentage
Video	553	22.3%
Voice Recording	30	1.2%
Live Broadcast	197	7.9%
Natural Photo	111	4.5%
Proverbs and Prayers	174	7.0%
Maps and Graphics	238	9.6%
Interviews	23	0.9%
Adding People	188	7.6%
No Focus	32	1.3%
News Quote	241	9.7%
Photo from the Event Scene	695	28.0%

Reporting *photos from the event scenes* that the Israeli media enhances its credibility by attaching the events with explicit pictures bearing many contents. Often such images reflect power, superiority, sympathy, and compassion aimed at showing the world that the occupation is superior militarily, technologically, morally, and humanely to children, elderly, and women; even if they were Palestinians; as well as tolerant and democratic with other minorities and religions to gain the world's sympathy and support at various levels. These messages represent an indictment against the Palestinians' virtues to justify everything the occupation does against them.

### Effective Solutions from News

The analysis results in Table 4 demonstrated that peace and coexistence mean normalisation with occupation by ditching the Arab and Islamic identity, dismissing the intellectual and historical heritage, and embracing the occupation as more technologically advanced and militarily superior. For instance, some traditional Palestinian dishes, such as *Tabbouleh* (vegetarian salad with bulgur wheat), *Arayes* (meat-stuffed pitas), and *Kunafa* (a kind of dessert), have been referred to as eastern Israeli food. Similarly, has been referred to as one of Israel's musical instruments. Further, visiting the occupying state and sending congratulations and wishes to them has been considered peaceful. However, it is an act of defeat. It has a negative impact on the Palestinian national identity.

Table 4: Proposed effective solutions from news of Israeli Arabic-speaking social media pages

Proposed Effective Solutions	Number of Posts	Percentage
Peace and Coexistence	816	35.8%
Force and Wars	873	38.3%
Unresolved	593	26.0%
Total	2282	100%

Regarding *force and wars* as a solution presented in the sample posts, this solution is concerned with those who reject the existence of the occupation and resist it either peacefully or militarily. From the occupier's perspective, this solution questions the value of the land as a reference for the Palestinians and the significance of resistance as the title of the Palestinian life. The peace and coexistence seem good, but it calls for domestication and surrender. Though *force and wars* result in cruelty and pain, it is the most accurate expression of the occupation's aggressive reality. Despite such a solution's harshness, it preserves the Palestinians' dignity and insists on their right to remain in their homeland.

#### CONCLUSION

Social media platforms like Facebook are becoming more potent in delivering messages in this era. Therefore, governments and politicians paid massive attention to these platforms and dedicated official teams to carefully post content that carries particular ideologies these governments wish to deliver to the audience. Israel is one of these governments that exploited Facebook to imply messages to the Palestinian audience. Israel, the state of occupation that occupied the land of Palestine in 1948, attempts to beautify its image to the Arab/Palestinian audience by carefully choosing the content it shares and its means. The results reveal that the Israeli official Facebook pages on the human side by touching on the cultural aspects and attempting to express its pride in its military power and ability to strike the enemy, the Palestinian resistance. Such attempts may lead the youth to believe that there is no solution to the struggle, but to co-exist, as implied in these postings. Therefore, the study recommends analysing the Facebooker's comments on these pages to measure whether they interact positively or negatively with the content of these pages.

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