

Diplomatic Crises between Türkiye and Israel and The Attitude of Global Actors After The Palestine-Israel Crisis

SİBEL ELİF ÖZDİLEK

*International Relations, Institute of Economic and Social Sciences,
Ufuk University, Ahlatlıbel, Incek Şht. Savcı Mehmet Selim Kiraz Blv No : 129,
06805 Gölbaşı/Ankara, Turkey*
Corresponding author: elif.ozdilek@ufuk.edu.tr

Received: 20 April 2025

Accepted: 01 August 2025

Abstract

The relationship between Turkey and Israel has developed within a multifaceted framework. Turkey, which is recognized as the first Muslim country to recognize the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, has experienced fluctuations in its diplomatic relations with Israel. Military agreements and commercial cooperation have been made between the two countries at various times; however, there have also been significant periods of tension. Before the 1990s, Turkish-Israeli relations remained relatively low, but subsequent developments have led to a deepening of these ties. However, the 2000s marked a shift towards increasing tension, particularly regarding the Palestinian issue. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) developed positive relations with both European and Middle Eastern countries in the early years of its rule. Within this framework, the AK Party administration has strengthened ties with Israel while continuously confirming its support for the Palestinian people. Indeed, instances of disagreement or conflict between Israel and Palestine have led to serious crises between the AK Party government, which has a pro-Palestinian stance, and Israel. Conflict analysis, which has an important place in the discipline of International Relations, deals with the definition of an existing problem, the actors of the problem and the analysis of solutions to the problem. In defining the problem, the historical background of the conflict, the analysis of the cause, the current situation analysis, regional and global analyses are included. In actor analyses, the profiles of the actors, their demands, and the peace capacities of the parties are written. After these stages, when and why the conflict emerged, what kind of searches and suggestions can be offered for the solution of the conflict are examined. This article aims to shed light on the deep crises that have emerged between Turkey and US-backed Israel since 2000, using a macro perspective with the traditional literature review method. It also aims to identify the root causes of the conflicts that have emerged in the bilateral relations of these two nations and to investigate the attitudes of global actors after the Palestine-Israel crisis.

Keywords: Türkiye; Israel; Palestine; Crisis; International Politics

Introduction

Turkey-Israel relations have always had an important place in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, which was the first Muslim country to recognize the State of Israel established in 1948, has had an important place in its policy towards the Middle East region, and its relations with Israel have changed periodically. The relations between the two countries, which began to develop especially in the 1990s, have experienced their most intense period with the military and commercial agreements made. These

intensified relations between the two countries continued to a certain extent after the Cold War.¹ The Arab world, which reacted to the increasingly developing relations between Turkey and Israel, described Turkey as Israel's patron in the Middle East. However, it should be noted that the relations between Turkey and Israel are a matter of course and are a move against Syria and Greece, which began to get closer in 1995.² Indeed, in the context of the changing conjuncture and governments in the 2000s, relations between Turkey and Israel first began to decline and then became tense. Despite Turkey's reaction to Israel under A. Sharon, who responded harshly to the Al-Aqsa Intifada³ that began in Palestine in 2000, military and commercial relations between the two countries continued. So much so that by the end of 2001, the trade volume between Turkey and Israel had reached a record level of 1.3 billion dollars.⁴ As can be seen, Turkey and Israel, who were at odds particularly over Palestine, continued to develop commercial and military cooperation. Based on this, in Turkey, which was seen to be pursuing a balancing policy between Palestine and Israel, the coalition government led by B. Ecevit was dissolved and early elections were held.

The AKP, which came to power alone as a result of the early elections in November 2002, continued the balancing policy that Turkey had been pursuing between Palestine and Israel in the first years of its rule. However, the first crisis broke out between the AKP government and Israel, which reacted harshly to the inhumane sanctions imposed by the Israeli state against the ongoing Al-Aqsa intifada in Palestine. During this process, the AKP government's close relationship with Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement/Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya) deepened the tension between Turkey and Israel. Apart from the Palestinian issue, other events in the Middle East also increased the tension between Turkey and Israel. The rejection of the March 1, 2003 motion by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) during the military intervention of the United States of America (USA) in Iraq is the most important of these. In short, unlike the 1990s, Turkey-Israel relations, which entered a tense period in the 2000s, have been experiencing deep crises to this day. In this study, which conducts periodic analysis, it is aimed to reveal the main reasons for the crises that emerged in the relations between the two countries and how these crises may evolve in the future. It is also aimed to evaluate the attitudes of global actors after the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis. For this purpose, the crises between Turkey and Israel in the post-2000 period were examined from a macro perspective using the traditional literature review method and a realistic perspective.

Changes in the Security Architecture of the Middle East Region

In the Middle East region, three important developments have occurred in the post-2000 period: the weakening of important actors such as Iraq, Egypt and Syria and their withdrawal from the regional power equation; the weakening of the "Reformist Islamism" ideology, which provided mass support and high public awareness for the Palestinian issue, and the strengthening of the "Status Quo Islamism" ideology; and the turning of actors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE to a pro-active foreign policy. All these developments have supported the change in the security architecture of the Middle East region and have led to the shift of the region's center of gravity towards the Dubai-Riyadh axis. Although there are some differences of opinion between the UAE and Saudi rulers on regional and global issues,^{5,6} both countries continue to play a central role in Middle East politics in the recent period.

Firstly, Iraq, Syria and Egypt have been at the center of the Middle East region in terms of demographic, military, cultural and intellectual aspects throughout history. All three countries have a large and developing human resource and an increasingly educated and capable population. All three countries have played a leadership role in the region both in the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods and have vast military experience. These countries have also played important roles in recent Middle

East politics. Of these countries, Egypt and Syria, which claim leadership in the region through the Socialist Arab Nationalism/Baath ideology, have always been at the forefront of the wars against Israel and paid a heavy price in the Arab-Israeli wars that took place in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973.^{7,8,9} When looked at especially from the perspective of Syria and Egypt, the main national enemy of these two countries is Israel.¹⁰ All three countries, in the period following their independence, made large investments in their military/industrial¹¹ capacities for many years, trying to gain capabilities that could balance Israel militarily in the region.

The developments in the post-2000 period resulted in Iraq, Syria and Egypt weakening and withdrawing from the regional power equation. The first change in the regional security architecture began with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The instability that Iraq fell into following the invasion led to the country turning inward and moving away from regional issues.¹² The country, which fell under Iranian influence after the US withdrawal in the 2010s, became an area of proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia through the Shia-Sunni conflict. The country, which had to deal with the separatist claims of the Kurds in the 2010s, reached its peak of tension and instability with ISIS's occupation of Mosul in 2014.¹³ Therefore, Iraq weakened, had to turn inward and lost its weight in regional politics significantly in the period following the US invasion in 2003.

The most important event that initiated the change in the regional security architecture was undoubtedly the Arab Spring process. With the street movements that began in 2010, Egypt and Syria fell into a serious spiral of instability. The military intervention of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria in street demonstrations has dragged the country into an environment of civil war and instability that has been going on for over a decade. The Assad regime, which had to rely on Russia and Iran to survive and suppress the rebellion during this process^{14,15} weakened as a result of the prolonged civil war, withdrawn into itself and lost interest in regional issues. The suspension of Syria's membership in the Arab League during the Arab Spring process has also led to the regime being isolated in the region.

During the Arab Spring, Egypt's political and economic stability was also seriously damaged. After Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign as a result of street movements, the first free elections held in the country, which was governed by a military council, were won by the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, Mohammed Morsi. After the military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013, the country entered a period of serious instability.¹⁶ During the Arab Spring, the civil wars that broke out in countries such as Yemen and Libya, the division experienced by Sudan, and the Renaissance Dam built by Ethiopia on the Nile led Egypt to turn its attention to these areas.¹⁷ During this period, Egypt, which also entered a very difficult period economically, tried to maintain its political and economic stability thanks to the generous aid provided by the Gulf countries.¹⁸ All these developments resulted in the weakening of Egypt's central role in regional politics.

The process that began with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and continued with the Arab Spring in 2010 resulted in the weakening of important actors in the region such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt. These regional instabilities that emerged in the post-2000 period occupied Arab states with their own internal affairs, and therefore Arab politicians lost interest in the Palestinian issue.¹⁹ During this period, issues such as the weak and collapsed state systems that emerged after the civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, the threats posed by the rise of ISIS throughout the region, the increasing Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions following the threat posed by Iran's increasing political and ideological influence on conservative regimes, and the deepening proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia took precedence over the Palestinian issue in the eyes of Arab politicians.

The second development affecting the regional security architecture is the weakening of the "Reformist Islamism" ideology represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, which has the ability to generate mass support and high public awareness for the Palestinian issue, and the strengthening of the "Status Quo Islamism ideology. The Reformist Islamism ideology led by the Muslim Brotherhood

movement has managed to keep the Palestinian issue and the victimization experienced by the Palestinians on the agenda strongly in both the Middle Eastern states and societies and the Western public opinion for nearly a century.²⁰ The Reformist Islamism ideology led by the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region led the demands for political change in countries such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia during the Arab Spring. The Status Quo Islamism ideology led by the Saudis opposed the demands for political change by defining all kinds of demands for change as sedition.²¹ As the Arab Spring process engulfed the entire region, the Saudi regime mobilized the Wahhabi ulema to brand the protests in the country and the entire region as illegitimate. In the fatwas they issued, the ulema confirmed the Islamic identity of the Saudi regime and defined demands for change as sedition. In order to declare these demands for change illegitimate, the ulema often resorted to propaganda that Shiite Iran inspired the protests.²²

The failure of the expected change in Syria during the Arab Spring, the exclusion of structures affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood from the administration following the military coup in Egypt in 2013 and the crisis in Tunisia in 2021 have been accepted as the failure of the Reformist Islamist ideology. The failure of this organizing ideology, which has generated mass support and high public awareness for the Palestinian issue for many years and constituted the highest social ground for demands for change in the Middle East and the Islamic world, to achieve meaningful success during the Arab Spring has weakened the reputation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the Reformist Islamist ideology led by the movement in the eyes of the masses. Indeed, in July 2022, İbrahim Münir, who was the acting chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council, announced that the Muslim Brotherhood movement was withdrawing from politics.²³ There are important internal and external reasons for this decision, which led the organization to abandon its political claims. First of all, the arrest of the Organization's senior executives after the coup in 2013 and its division into two camps, London and Istanbul, led to a leadership crisis within the Organization.²⁴ In addition to the organizational political divisions it experienced, the attempts of countries such as Qatar and Turkey, which the Organization positioned itself on, to get closer to the Egyptian regime also limited the Organization's political capabilities.²⁵ The fact that some countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have defined the Organization as a terrorist organization since 2014 and the pressure exerted on the Organization by global powers such as the USA have also played an important role in the weakening of Reformist Islamist thought in the face of Status Quo Islamist thought.^{26,27,28}

Despite the weakening of the Reformist Islamist ideology during the Arab Spring, the Status Quo Islamist ideology led by Saudi Arabia has begun to grow stronger throughout the region, especially in the Gulf region. Supported by the Saudis, the Salafi ideology²⁹ supporters have managed to become an important element of regional politics in the current period.^{30,31} The Salafi ideology, which strongly prohibits criticism of the administration and constantly inculcates obedience and loyalty, has served to strengthen the status quo structure regionally. The Salafi ideology supporters, who strongly oppose the demands for change that challenge the status quo throughout the region, have put pressure on the administrations and provided theological legitimacy for the violent suppression of the Arab street's demands for change by the status quo states.

The latest development affecting the regional security architecture is the rising profile of Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which survived the Arab Spring without any serious damage, in regional and global politics. In an atmosphere of political instability where the entire region was shaken by street movements, these countries, which remained relatively calm thanks to the large sums of money they obtained from hydrocarbon trade and international support, managed to survive the Arab Spring without any damage. In fact, with the exception of the years 2015-20, they have also gained significant economic power due to the high oil prices during the last twenty years. Despite the weakening of important actors in the region such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt, the

Gulf countries, which have not lost any of their power, have turned to an assertive and interventionist policy in the Levant, Red Sea and South Arabia regions.³² The military intervention in Bahrain in 2011, Yemen in 2015 and the blockade imposed on Qatar in 2017 are the most important examples of this interventionist policy. The UAE's deployment in regions with geopolitical advantages near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Saudi Arabia's takeover of the Tiran and Sanafir islands belonging to Egypt are the most important examples of both actors' ambitious policies towards the Red Sea.

Since the early 2000s, three important developments have affected the regional security architecture in the Middle East. First, the region's important actors, Iraq, Syria and Egypt, have weakened and withdrawn from the regional power equation. Second, while the Reformist Islamism ideology, which provided mass support and high public awareness for the Palestinian issue in the region, has weakened, the Status Quo Islamism ideology has strengthened. Finally, Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which survived the Arab Spring without suffering any damage and even increased their power during the process thanks to high oil prices and international support, have turned to a proactive foreign policy. As a result of all these developments, the center of gravity of the Middle East has shifted to the Gulf countries, which are economically "giant" but militarily "dwarf". During this process, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have begun to play a leadership role in regional issues, especially the Palestinian issue. The UAE-Saudi axis, which, unlike Iraq, Syria and Egypt, is extremely inadequate in terms of military capability and capacity, demographic advantages, cultural and historical experience, has played a leadership role in regional issues, especially the Palestinian issue, and has significantly transformed regional politics.

Recent Crisis between Türkiye and Israel

The relations between Turkey and Israel, which can be discussed in four main periods, first began with Turkey's recognition of the state of Israel, which was established in 1948. The reason for this decision of recognition, which was met with a reaction especially by Arab countries, was shown as Israel's membership in the United Nations (UN).³³ The relations between the two countries, which continued with ups and downs from this period until the 1990s, intensified in the 1990s. Indeed, in this period, which is considered as the golden years of Turkey-Israel relations, the two countries made mutual official visits as well as military and economic cooperation.³⁴ While Turkey paid ministerial visits to Israel in 1992, in 1993, upon the death of President T. Özal, the then Israeli Foreign Minister Ş. Peres [who became the President of Israel in 2007] represented his country at the funeral ceremony. In 1994, two years after Israeli President E. Weizman's visit to Turkey, President S. Demirel visited Israel.

The mutual visits between the two countries went a step further and military and commercial agreements were made. The Military Education and Cooperation Agreement (AEİA), the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement (SSİA) signed by Turkish President S. Demirel and Israeli President E. Weizman in 1996 are some of the cooperation between the two countries. The driving force behind the development of these cooperations was the perception of threats from the Middle East and the search for security. In addition, the close relations established by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) with the Israeli Ministry of Defense and army during this period also led to an increase in relations between the two countries. The visit of the Chief of General Staff of the period, I. Hakkı Karadayı, to Israel during this period also led to a first in relations between the two countries.³⁵ As a result of the increasing relations between the two countries, the USA, Turkey and Israel conducted the "Trusted Mermaid" rescue exercise off the coast of Haifa in 1999.

The fourth (last) period of Turkey-Israel relations, which we have examined in four periods, started with the 2000s. Unlike the 1990s when positive relations were developed between the two

countries, problems started to arise at the beginning of the 2000s. With the change of government in Israel and the coming to power of the A. Sharon government, which adopted a harsher policy on the Palestinian issue, the increase in the conflict between Palestine and Israel directly affected the relations between Turkey and Israel. Turkey, which did not remain silent in the face of Israel's systematic policy of atrocities against the Palestinian people, organized many anti-Israel demonstrations. In addition, the Prime Minister of the period, B. Ecevit, told the Israeli Prime Minister A. Sharon, who was visiting Turkey, that "if the hope for peace between Palestine and Israel is lost, the relations between Turkey and Israel will also be adversely affected". The Palestinian people, who resisted Israel's attacks, were defeated in the Second World War. The relations between the B. Ecevit government, which declared that it supported the Intifada and even stated that Israel was committing genocide, and Israel began to become increasingly tense. However, commercial and military cooperation between Turkey and Israel continued. So much so that an agreement was reached with an Israeli company for the modernization of one hundred and seventy M-60 tanks in the TSK inventory. Although the words of Israel's Ambassador to Ankara in 2001, D. Sultan, "Politics is politics. Economics is economics," created the belief that military and economic cooperation between the two countries would continue, on the one hand, Israel's increasing cruel policies towards Palestine and on the other hand, the change of government in Turkey led to deep crises in relations between the two countries. These crises, which we have grouped under five headings, are; Operation Cast Lead, Davos "One Minute" Crisis, Low Chair Incident, Mavi Marmara Crisis, Palmer Report and finally, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.

Operation Cast Lead

As a result of Israel's pressure to render Hamas unable to govern the country, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the government in June 2007 and demanded the establishment of a new administration in the West Bank from the Fatah militants. In response, Hamas stated that they were the elected government and took control of Gaza. Israel, disturbed by this situation, blockaded Gaza. Egypt intervened to end the conflict between Israel and Hamas and signed a ceasefire on June 18, 2008. In December 2008, Hamas stated that Israel was not complying with the terms of the ceasefire and that there would be no further reconciliation with Israel. Following this statement by Hamas, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza on December 27, 2008.³⁶

In Operation Cast Lead, the most comprehensive operation launched by Israel in the region after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel dropped more than a hundred tons of bombs on Gaza and even attacked hospitals, which caused a great reaction in Turkey. Strongly condemned by both political elites and the Turkish public, relations with Israel have gone beyond regression and have become tense. Another reason for Turkey's reaction to Israel, which attacks the Palestinian people in a way that is incompatible with any humanitarian or moral values, is that the promise made to it has not been kept. In fact, Israel, which promised the AKP leaders that no harm would be done to civilians during the operation and that no human tragedy would occur, did not keep its promise, which was considered a diplomatic disrespect towards Turkey. In addition to the fact that the conflict between Israel and Syria, in which Turkey has made great efforts as a mediator, has not been resolved, the AK Party leaders, who think that Israel has wasted its time and effort for regional peace after its attacks on Palestine, have begun to describe Israel as a terrorist state. In fact, Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdogan did not include Israel among his series of visits to Middle Eastern countries in the first week of 2009.³⁷

As can be seen, Israel, which initiated Operation Cast Lead, the first deep crisis of the post-2000 period in Turkey-Israel relations, first made it clear whether it wanted stability and peace in the Middle East. Despite the negotiations carried out with great effort, Israel, which ended the ceasefire first with Syria and then with Palestine, damaged regional peace on the one hand and disrupted

Turkey's image of "mediator and order-making actor" in the Middle East on the other. In this context, Israel, which showed that it could confront all countries in the region, including Turkey, within the context of its own national interests and occupation policies, caused the instability in the Middle East to increase. Consequently, Turkey's relations with Israel, which it now describes as a regional problem and even a terrorist state, have been gradually deteriorated with successive deep crises. In fact, the second of the deep crises occurred very shortly after at the Davos Summit in 2009.

Davos "One Minute" Crisis

This forum, which coincided with a period when relations between Turkey and Israel were tense, led to a debate between Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and Israeli President Peres due to the events in Gaza. In the first part of his speech, Erdogan criticized the Gaza operations and stated that Hamas should be included at the table for a solution. Erdogan, who said that Israel used disproportionate force, concluded his speech by stating that Israel did not lift the embargo on Gaza despite Hamas complying with the ceasefire. Following this speech, Israeli President Shimon Peres took the floor, stating that Hamas was the cause of all the problems and accusing Hamas of being a dictator. He asked Erdogan what his stance would be if a rocket was fired at Istanbul, waved his hand and spoke loudly.³⁸

In response to Peres, Erdogan said: "Your voice is very loud. You are older than me, I know that it is a requirement of a guilty psychology for your voice to be louder than mine. My voice will not be so loud. You should know this. When it comes to killing, you know how to kill very well. I know very well how you killed and shot the children on the beaches. Two people who served as prime ministers in your country have very important things to say to me. You have prime ministers who say, 'I feel differently happy' when they enter Palestine on tanks. You have prime ministers who say, 'I feel happy when I enter Palestine on tanks.' And you give me numbers. I will give you the name, maybe some of you are curious."

In the post-2000 period, the Davos "One Minute" incident, the second deep crisis between Turkey and Israel, went down in history as one of the harshest actions against Israel at the international level. Following this incident, which paved the way for the reshuffling of cards, especially in foreign policy, many Middle Eastern countries began to see Turkey as a regional leader, and R. Tayyip Erdogan was declared a hero. As can be seen, the Davos crisis raised Turkey's image, especially in the Arab world, while putting relations with Israel in a deadlock. Israel's exclusion from the previously planned "Anatolian Eagle" exercise, which included countries such as the US, Israel and Italy, showed that the crisis between Turkey and Israel would deepen. Indeed, the "diplomatic rudeness" deliberately shown to the Turkish Tel Aviv Ambassador O. Çelikkol, who was summoned to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the crisis between the two countries, caused a new deep crisis.³⁹ As a result of this crisis, which went down in political history literature as the "Low Seat Incident," diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Israel dropped to zero.

The Low Seat Incident

Following the Davos "One Minute" crisis in 2009, the deterioration in relations between Turkey and Israel was not only experienced by governments. Israel, which was also harshly criticized by the Turkish public and media, began to be referred to with such epithets as "child killer" and "terror state". In addition, the high-rating TV series "Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu" and the TV series "Ayrılık" broadcast on the state television channel Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) gave the crisis between Turkey and Israel a character beyond politics. Realizing the gravity of the situation

due to the admiration of the anti-Israeli scenes in both series by the public, the Israeli administration summoned the Turkish Ambassador to Tel Aviv, O. Çelikkol, to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) on January 11, 2010 regarding the issue. It was understood that the real aim of the Israeli administration, which apparently wanted to receive information about the scenes in the series in question, was to retaliate against Turkey through the press. So much so that, in the meeting where the Israeli press was also present, an attempt was made to diplomatically humiliate Turkey by having the Turkish Ambassador O. Çelikkol sit on a lower chair than the one occupied by the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister D. Ayalon. Following this incident, which was carried out completely consciously, D. Ayalon stated in a statement he made in 2003 that Turkey was Israel's best friend in the region], and he told the press members, "I would like to draw your attention to the fact that we are sitting on a high seat and the Turkish diplomatic representative is sitting on a lower seat, that only our flag is on the table and that we are not smiling."⁴⁰

Following the statement by Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister D. Ayalon that diplomatic relations would be severed if Turkey did not apologize for this diplomatic incivility, Israel was forced to back down after presenting an official letter of apology to the Turkish Tel Aviv Embassy.⁴¹ The reactions within the country also played a role in Israel's back down. Because, in Israel, which is governed by a coalition government, a part of the administration stated that this move towards Turkey was unnecessary and inappropriate, and emphasized that these crises between the two countries were pushing Turkey further East with each passing day. D. Ayalon, who stated that his move was just a joke and that he had absolutely no intention of humiliating the Turkish Tel Aviv Ambassador upon the reactions from Turkey and the Israeli opposition, made another unstatesmanlike statement, saying, "If you knew how narrow and low my room in the Knesset is, you would understand me."⁴²

In the Low Chair incident, which is considered the third deep crisis between Turkey and Israel in the period after 2000, Turkey implemented a rational crisis management and made Israel apologize. Thus, Turkey, which further increased its international image, showed once again that it is an important actor in the Middle East. Turkey, which became a country appreciated especially by Arab countries, continued to deteriorate its relations with Israel at the same rate. In fact, after this crisis, the Mavi Marmara Crisis occurred, which would increase the level of tension between the two countries to a great extent.⁴³

Mavi Marmara Crisis and The Palmer Report

Having entered a deep crisis with Operation Cast Lead in 2008, relations between Turkey and Israel reached rock bottom on May 31, 2010. Activists from many parts of the world who wanted to go to Gaza to break the blockade imposed on Gaza by Israel and to raise awareness on the issue in the international community were attacked by Israeli soldiers.⁴⁴ Nine Turkish citizens and one American citizen of Turkish origin lost their lives as a result of the heinous attack carried out by Israeli forces on the Freedom Flotilla, which included Turkish-flagged ships. Due to the fact that such an incident occurred for the first time between the two countries, Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations, which were going through the worst period in their history, were reduced to the level of second secretary, just like in 1980.⁴⁵

It took six years to overcome the Mavi Marmara crisis, which brought relations between Turkey and Israel to the breaking point, and for relations between the two countries to gradually normalize. Starting in 2016, the two countries began to reestablish dialogue and established new collaborations. However, it is a fact that the Mavi Marmara crisis left permanent marks on relations between Turkey and Israel. In fact, the relations that were reestablished between the two countries tended to deteriorate, especially when it came to the issue of Palestine. For example, in 2018, Turkish

President R. Tayyip Erdogan reacted strongly to the killing of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers who were protesting the decision to move the US Embassy to East Jerusalem, accusing Israel of genocide. Although there were minor crises between Turkey and Israel following this incident, no major crisis occurred until the end of 2023. The deaths of thousands of Palestinian civilians as a result of Israel's bombing of Gaza in response to Hamas's Al-Aqsa Flood operation against Israel on October 7, 2023, and the humanitarian tragedy that has been going on in the region for months, have led to a new crisis between Türkiye and Israel.⁴⁶

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood

On Saturday, October 7, 2023 (the anniversary of the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah and the Yom Kippur War), the armed wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, launched an attack on Israel, known as the "Iron Dome" due to its superior defense technology.⁴⁷ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which carried out simultaneous operations in many places in Israel, killed and took hostages many Israeli soldiers.^{48,49} The Israeli administration, which considered these attacks, referred to as the Al-Aqsa Flood, as "Israel's September 11,"⁵⁰ tried to turn the crisis into an opportunity and prepare a legitimate ground for the human tragedy it would cause.¹¹ Evangelicals, Globalists and Zionists,⁵¹ who developed various policies in this direction, launched an all-out genocide without any regard for innocent civilians by launching attacks on Palestine, especially Gaza, first from the air and then from the ground.

Israel's attacks on the Palestinian people, which are neither humane nor morally warlike, have led to a human tragedy that has been going on for months. Israel, which carries out massacres without regard to civilians, women, the elderly, babies and children before the eyes of the entire world, claims to be fighting Hamas, which it has declared a terrorist organization, but in fact it itself acts like a terrorist state. Because Israel, where protests have been held from many countries around the world, has also received a backlash from Turkey, both at the political and social level.

Due to the deep crises mentioned in the previous sections of the study, the relations between Turkey and Israel, which had been tense for a long time and were just beginning to improve, were entering a normalization process when Operation Al-Aqsa Flood took place. So much so that on September 20, 2023, Turkish President R. Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister B. Netanyahu, who were in the US for the UN General Assembly meeting, met face to face to establish political and economic cooperation between the two countries. One of the main topics of the meeting was the conflict between Palestine and Israel.⁵² However, the mutual visit program was canceled due to the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which took place only seventeen days after the meeting of the leaders of the two countries.⁵³

Turkey, which has chosen to stand by Palestine in the struggle of the Palestinian people, which has been the focal point of almost all crises between Turkey and Israel from the past to the present, has opposed Israel's new policy of cruelty both politically and socially. In this context, Turkey, which first restricted and then completely stopped commercial and military agreements with Israel, has organized many protests and campaigns against Israel.⁵⁴ The decision of the Turkish Ministry of Trade to halt the export of fifty-four product groups to Israel, followed by the complete suspension of commercial relations, has led to a relapse in relations between the two countries.⁵⁵ In addition, the Turkish society, which has created awareness about not consuming products of Israeli origin, is taking action to prevent the sale and consumption of products of Israeli origin in canteens and dining halls of state institutions and organizations, guesthouses/guesthouses and hotels, restaurants and markets as much as possible.⁵⁶ These trade sanctions imposed on Israel by Turkey, Israel's fifth largest export partner,⁵⁷ are extremely important in terms of support given to Palestine. In fact, the New York Times

Newspaper stated in its news article titled “As Turkey Cuts Trade Ties, Israel’s Isolation Grows” that these sanctions imposed by Turkey are increasingly isolating Israel in the region.⁵⁸

Despite being the first Muslim country to recognize Israel, Turkey, which has supported the Palestinian cause from the past to the present, has once again sided with Palestine in an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For this reason, Turkey, which is experiencing a new crisis with Israel, has come to the point of halting trade with Israel despite the economic difficulties it is currently experiencing. In addition, sanctions are being imposed on Israel, where military cooperation has also been halted, by the state and society. Turkey-Israel relations, which entered a new crisis due to the Aqsa Flood Operation and subsequent developments that took place just as relations with Israel were beginning to normalize, are experiencing their fifth deep crisis in the post-2000 period. This crisis may result in serious steps that may lead to the suspension of diplomatic contacts between the two countries and the recall of ambassadors. Because Turkey seems determined to continue its diplomatic pressure on Israel by increasing its support for Palestine on international platforms. In addition, the Turkish society continues to show its support for Palestine by boycotting Israeli goods. This situation draws attention as a development that could change the balances in the Middle East.

Palestine-Israel Crisis and Global Actor’s Policies

Palestine is a geography that stands out with its rich cultural and historical texture as the cradle of many civilizations throughout history. However, these lands also contain a problem that is at the center of a complex political and social reality. This problem is the source of many conflicts that have emerged in the region since the beginning of the 20th century and continue to this day.⁵⁹

The roots of the Palestinian Question lie in a series of factors deeply rooted in historical and cultural contexts. The roots of this problem began with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the First World War, and were further complicated by the political, military and diplomatic developments that took place in the region thereafter.⁶⁰

The Palestinian Question is at the center of historical, political and cultural conflicts that have lasted for years. This complex issue represents a long-term conflict in the Middle East, especially between the Palestinian territories and the State of Israel.⁶¹

This issue dates back to the early 20th century. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the claims over Palestinian lands after World War II influenced political developments in the region. The United Nations’ proposal in 1947 to divide Palestine into two states only escalated tensions and laid the foundation for conflict in the region.⁶²

The Palestinian Question involves a series of complex issues, including territorial claims, the situation of refugees, the demarcation of borders, and access to holy sites. The establishment of the State of Israel and the wars that followed have changed the demographic and political balance in the region and have deepened the problem. Today, ongoing territorial disputes in areas such as the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip make it difficult to resolve. This problem is not limited to territorial claims and political struggles; it also has a major humanitarian dimension. The difficulties experienced by Palestinian refugees, the difficulties they face in daily life, and the lack of humanitarian assistance underscore the urgent need for a solution to the problem. The international community should not ignore this humanitarian dimension.⁶³

Despite many attempts at a solution and peace plans, the problem remains unresolved. Diplomatic efforts, international mediation and peace processes provide hopes for a lasting solution in the region, but the historical and cultural depths of the conflict make this process difficult. A comprehensive solution that balances the security concerns and rights demands of both sides can form the basis for peace in the region.

The Palestinian Question represents a deep conflict with its historical and cultural complexity. However, the quest for humanity, justice and peace can contribute to its solution. Greater efforts by the international community to strengthen dialogue between the parties and find a just solution can form the basis for a long-term peace between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.⁶⁴

US Policy towards Palestine

The establishment of the State of Israel marked an important turning point in international relations. The role of the US in this process and being the first state to recognize Israel are among the factors that affect US policies toward Israel. The US recognition of Israel marked the beginning of close relations between the two countries, and these relations have deepened over time. In addition, the influence of pro-Israel lobbies in the US stands out as a determining factor in US policies toward Israel. These lobbies play an effective role in shaping US policies toward Israel and also guide political decision-making processes in the US. It is expected that the influence of pro-Israel lobbies will continue in the upcoming US presidential elections, and therefore the influence of these lobbies on the course of US policies toward Israel will maintain its importance. This situation is an important element in understanding the dynamics in international relations and US policies toward the Middle East.

The US's stance on the Palestinian issue has shown various tendencies over time. Although it has not had a clear discourse in general, there have been occasional views that the 1967 borders should be returned to. The US, like most international states, has supported the two-state solution proposal and stated that Palestinian refugees should return to their country and that Jewish settlement areas could be limited. However, the US's stance on this issue can change from time to time and different emphases can be made in different periods. The US's approach to the Palestinian issue is shaped by the balances in international relations and factors in domestic politics. This situation shows the complexity and diversity of the US's Middle East policies.

Another important factor that shapes the US's Middle East policies is direct aid and support for Zionism and Israel. However, the US has also tried to establish good relations with the Arab states in the region because it wants to balance its strategic interests in the region. This balancing effort has complicated the US's policies in the Middle East.

Another important factor affecting the US's Middle East policies is the Jewish lobbies in America. These lobbies have a significant impact on American politics and foreign policy. The influence of these lobbies is quite evident, especially in relations with Israel and policies towards Israel. In this context, the role of Zionism, Israel and the Jewish lobbies in America in shaping the US's Middle East policies is great.

The US support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stems from a number of factors that shape its strategic interests in the Middle East. The first of these is that the Middle East has rich energy resources, including oil. These resources are of great importance to the global economy and strategic balance of power. In addition, the conflicts and instability in the Middle East encourage the search for a strategic ally that will stabilize the region and protect American interests.

In an Arab and Muslim-centered region, Israel, a non-Muslim state, is gaining importance as a strategic partner for the United States. This situation reflects the United States' efforts to protect its interests in the region and maintain its balance policies in the Middle East. Another reason for the US's support for Israel is the concern that Arab-Muslim unity in the region could pose a threat to American interests in the use and distribution of resources. In this context, the US's support for Israel aims to protect its strategic interests in the Middle East and to maintain balance in the region. The US provides Israel with military and economic aid worth approximately 3 billion US dollars every year.⁶⁵

In 2017, US President Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to move his embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem created great controversy and concern in the Middle East. While this step clearly demonstrated US support for Israel, it also increased tensions in the region and made the peace process more difficult.

The US's efforts to strengthen its presence in the region by supporting Israeli policies have a long history. This support is a result of strategic, political and economic factors. While the US's support for Israel reflects its commitment to its allies and interests in the region, it also shapes the balance policies in the region. How this support affects security and stability in the Middle East and how it affects relations with other actors in the region is an important topic of discussion. Israel has a strategic position to act as an outpost for the US in the region.⁶⁶

During the Bush administration, the United States had the opportunity to directly intervene in the Middle East through large-scale military interventions such as the Iraq war. This intervention affected the political and strategic balances in the region and significantly undermined the stability of the region. Although the Obama administration tried different approaches in regional policies, unlike the Bush administration, no significant progress was made on the Palestinian issue. The Obama administration supported the two-state solution, but no tangible progress was made on this issue. This situation reflects the difficulties faced by the Obama administration in dealing with the complex policies and interests in the region.

The "Peace for Prosperity" initiative and the Abraham Accords of the same period clearly show that the US's primary goal is to normalize Israel's relations with Arab countries and to establish cooperative efforts against Iran in the region. These initiatives indicate a significant change in the political dynamics in the region and emphasize the direction of US policies in the Middle East.⁶⁷

Russia's Palestine Policy

Russia pursues various policies to increase its strategic interests in the Middle East and ensure regional stability. In this respect, its policies towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are also noteworthy.

In the Palestine-Israel conflict, Russia adopts the view that Israel occupies Palestinian lands and that the Palestinian people have the right to establish an independent state. Russian President Vladimir Putin advocates a two-state solution model, emphasizing that Israel and Palestine should exist side by side as independent and sovereign states. This policy shows that Russia is trying to act in a balanced manner in resolving the conflict.

While the Western world describes Hamas as a terrorist organization, Russia has a softer stance. Russia maintains that Hamas should be included in the political process by keeping channels of communication open. This approach is part of Russia's efforts to create a wider sphere of influence in the Middle East and also aims to create a counterweight to the West's unilateral policies.

Whenever conflicts begin, Russia calls for an immediate ceasefire and demands that humanitarian aid be delivered to those in need. This stance gives Russia the image of defending humanitarian values in the international arena and causes the West to question its support for Israel. Its calls for humanitarian aid to be admitted show the international community that Russia wants to play not only a military and political role in the region, but also a humanitarian role.

The Palestinian issue is causing Arab countries to reconsider their relations with the United States and seek alternative allies such as Russia and China. Russia is trying to use this situation to its advantage and gain a stronger position in the Middle East. The Arab countries' turn to Russia contributes to the change of the balance of power in the region and makes it easier for Russia to achieve its strategic goals.

Russia adopts a strategic approach in its Palestine policy. Russia, acting with the aim of ensuring regional stability, supports the establishment of Palestine as an independent state and demands the provision of humanitarian aid. This policy allows the Western world to question its support for Israel, while also contributing to Russia's increasing influence in the Middle East. Russia's stance on the Palestinian issue draws attention with both its humanitarian and strategic dimensions and plays an important role in shaping the policies of other actors in the region.⁶⁸

Russia's policies in the Middle East affect not only the regional balance of power but also the dynamics of international relations. Russia's flexible and multifaceted approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict serves the country's long-term strategic goals in the region.

China's Palestine Policy

China has supported the Palestinian people's struggle to establish an independent state internationally for a certain period since the establishment of the State of Israel. However, while providing this support, China has avoided statements or actions that could endanger its own interests in the region. This attitude shows that China's policies in the Middle East are balanced and dependent on various factors.

China's priority in the region has always been to protect its own interests. It can be said that China's foreign policy follows a balanced policy that does not jeopardize national interests by maintaining relations with both states regarding the Palestine-Israel conflict.⁶⁹

China has always maintained that the international community should be impartial and objective. The Chinese government says that both states have their faults, that Israel restricts the freedoms and right to life of the Palestinian people, and that the Palestinian people in turn threaten Israel's security.

When China's policy towards Palestine examined, we can say that it tries to maintain good relations with Israel and at the same time supports Palestine in the international arena.

Conclusion

The main subject of the study is the crises experienced in Turkey-Israel relations in the period after 2000 and the reasons for the deepening of these crises. Turkey-Israel relations, which started in 1949, are about to complete three quarters of a century. It can be said that no significant problems were experienced in the relations between the two countries until 2000 and even positive relations were developed. Although there were minor crises between the two countries in the 1980s, Turkey-Israel relations experienced their golden age in the 1990s. So much so that during this period, the two countries, which carried out many cooperations, especially on the basis of military security, established close relations under the influence of their common ally, the USA. The relations between the two countries, which became tense only during the Welfare-Path Government period (1996-1997), continued where they left off after the government was overthrown by the "post-modern" coup carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces.⁷⁰ In the 2000s, the harmony in the relations between the two countries gave way to crises. The common point of the crises that have occurred at regular intervals between Türkiye and Israel for approximately twenty-four years is the Palestinian issue.⁷¹

After 2000, although there was a decline in relations between Turkey and Israel due to minor crises until 2008, relations continued. However, relations between Turkey and Israel, which began to become tense after Turkey reacted to the Cast Lead Operation conducted by Israel in Palestine in 2008, have been experiencing deep crises since that date. The crisis between the two countries deepened after Turkish Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdogan reacted to Israel, which caused a human

tragedy in Gaza with the Cast Lead Operation, at the Davos Economic Forum in 2009. The Low Chair Crisis, which was a rematch for the Davos crisis for Israel, strained relations between the two countries even more, and relations came to a breaking point with the Mavi Marmara Incident in 2010.

As can be seen, the complex and periodically changing relations between Turkey and Israel have experienced five deep crises, especially in the period after 2000. Israel, which tries every way to achieve its expansion-based occupation policy, is seen to produce instability in the narrow sense of Palestine and in the broad sense of the Middle East. Acting in line with its own national interests and Zionist ideology, Israel has been systematically attacking Palestine, which it sees as its first target, from the past to the present, in order to achieve its great ideal of the Promised Land. In almost all of these periods of attack, the relations between Turkey and Israel have also entered into crisis. Although the two countries have overcome the crises they have experienced over time and continued their relations, it is possible to say that each crisis has left permanent marks on the relations between the two countries. The latest crisis, which started in the last months of 2023 and continues until today, is expected to deepen gradually if Israel continues its attacks on Palestine.

The Middle East, as it has throughout history, continues to be a geography where global and regional powers compete intensely. The region's geopolitical location, rich energy resources and strategic importance cause the Middle East to be at the centre of the global power struggle. In this context, the basis of the power struggle in the Middle East is the conflicts of interest of global and regional actors.

Global powers, especially the USA, Russia, China and the European Union, are trying to expand their spheres of influence by following different strategies in the Middle East. In the post-Cold War period, the USA has made various military interventions and diplomatic initiatives to maintain its leadership in the Middle East and has tried to protect its strategic interests through its allies in the region. Russia, on the other hand, has increased its influence in the region, especially with its intervention in the Syrian Civil War, and has begun to engage in a balanced power struggle with the USA. China is increasing its trade relations with the Middle East and its investments in the region in line with its energy security and economic interests. The European Union, on the other hand, is making efforts to ensure stability in the region mostly through diplomatic and humanitarian aid.

Among regional powers, countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel and Egypt stand out. These actors develop various alliances and competition strategies in order to maximize their own security and interests. In particular, the sectarian competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia has become one of the fundamental dynamics of internal conflicts in countries such as Syria, Yemen and Iraq. Turkey stands out as a regional power by balancing its relations with the West and maintaining its independent policies in the region. Israel, on the other hand, closely follows developments in the region in line with its security concerns and intervenes militarily when necessary. Egypt, on the other hand, shapes its regional policies in order to strengthen its leadership role in the Arab world and to maintain its internal stability.

Non-state actors also play an important role in the power struggle in the Middle East. Terrorist organizations, resistance movements and other actors increase instability in the region and pave the way for the intervention of international actors. The activities of these groups affect the strategic calculations of regional and global powers and cause the balance of power to be constantly reshaped.

As a result, the power struggle in the Middle East is shaped by the conflicts of interest between global and regional actors. The geopolitical position, energy resources and strategic importance of the region cause this struggle to continue. Achieving permanent stability in the Middle East is only possible if the actors act on the basis of common interests and develop regional cooperation. In this context, it is of great importance for the international community to develop policies that will ensure communication and cooperation among the actors in the region. Otherwise, the power struggle and

instability in the Middle East will continue to threaten global peace and security.

Notes

¹ Yeltin, H, Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Son Dönem Krizleri: Türk Muhalefetinin ve Kamuoyunun Yaklaşımı. *Artuklu Kaime Uluslararası Artuklu İktisadi ve İdari Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 4(1), 2021, pp. 1-33.

² Turkey's rapprochement with Israel in the mid-1990s certainly cannot be considered solely as a result of a pragmatic necessity. Because Turkey, which was also under the influence of geopolitical dynamics in the region, was struggling to gain the support of its southern neighbors while fighting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist organization. In particular, Syria's logistical support for the PKK and the military training agreement it signed with Greece made Turkey feel surrounded. In this case, rapprochement with Israel emerged as a balancing act for Turkey. In addition, Turkey's difficulty in obtaining military technology and materials from the West at a time when its relations with the European Union (EU) were tense also increased relations between the two countries. Indeed, cooperation with Israel helped Turkey close this gap, AA, 2021.

³ Euro News. 2023a. Türkiye-İsrail ekonomik ilişkileri ne durumda, ticaret hacmi AK Parti iktidarında nasıl değişti? 12.01.2025. www.tr.euronews.com/2023/10/11/turkiye-israil-ekonomik-iliskileri-ne-durumda-ticaret-hacmi-ak-parti-iktidarinda-nasil-deg.

⁴ Boran, T. K, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde Türkiye-İsrail ilişkileri. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 22(44), 2002, pp. 28-42.

⁵ Acar, Necmettin, Arap Baharı Sürecinde Ortadoğu'da Güvenlik ve Dış Politika, Suudi Arabistan Örneği. *Birey ve Toplum*, 8(16), 2018, pp. 139-171.

⁶ Cafero, Giorgio. 2023, 29 Agust. Sudan'da Suudi Arabistan-BAE rekabeti şiddetleniyor. *Mepa News*. 31.07.2025 <https://www.mepanews.com/sudanda-suudi-arabistan-bae-rekabetisiddetleniyor>

⁷ Çavuşoğlu, Esra, Körfez Ülkeleri ve Filistin: Güçlü Tarihsel Bağlar Temelinde Körfez Siyaseti. *Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 8(2), 2022, pp. 15-33.

⁸ Çinkara, G., & Coşkun, B. 2023b. Mapping the Genesis of the Abraham Accords. *Insight Turkey*, 5(2), 63-77.

⁹ Kemiksiz, Neşe, Arap-İsrail Sorunu ve Bölgesel Yansımaları. *Journal of Awareness (JoA.)* 3(Special), 2018, pp. 127-144.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Acar, Necmettin, Arap Baharı Sürecinde Ortadoğu'da Güvenlik ve Dış Politika: Suudi Arabistan Örneği. *Birey ve Toplum*, 8(16), 2018, pp. 139-171.

¹³ Kocatepe, Damla, Suudi Arabistan-İran Rekabeti: Mezhep Görünümlü Çıkar Çatışması. *Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 1(2), 2017, pp. 67-101.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Kılıç, Fatih, Arap Baharı Sonrası Mısır. Cüneyit Özşahin ve Orhan Batır (Ed). *Arap Baharı sonrası Ortadoğu: Bölgesel dönüşüm ve Reaksiyonlar* içinde, Hiperyayın. İstanbul, 2019, pp. 85-112.

¹⁷ Altunışık, M, *Arap dünyasında Türkiye algısı* (1. baskı). TESEV Yayınları, 2010.

¹⁸ Following the rejection of the IMF agreement in 2011, Qatar began to provide significant financial assistance to Egypt. By 2013, Qatar's aid to Egypt had exceeded \$8 billion. Following the military coup, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia promised Egypt \$12 billion in aid. By 2015, the total aid provided by these countries to Egypt had exceeded \$23 billion. The Gulf's financial support to Egypt continued to increase after 2015. The Gulf countries' donations to Egypt in 2022 alone, to help it cope with the economic problems caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, amounted to \$22 billion, CNN, 2023.

- ¹⁹ Bijan, A. ve Ejazi, E, The Perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Settlement in the Post- Arab Spring. Nesrin Kenar (Ed). *Contemporary Issues in The Balkans, Middle East, Asia & Africa* içinde, IJOPEC Publication. London, 2022, pp. 217-233.
- ²⁰ Mercan, Muhammet H, The adventure of Islamism in Egypt: A political system-based analysis. Lütif Sunar (Ed). *The Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Muslim Socio-Political Thought* içinde Routledge. London, 2021, pp. 143-155.
- ²¹ Bozkurt, Abdülgani, *Müslüman Kardeşler; Siyasal Meşruiyet ve Seçimler*, Ürdün Üzerine Bir, 2021.
- ²² Başkan, Birol, *The Politics of İslam*, Edinburgh University Press, 2021.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Al-Anani, Halil. 2021. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Old Problems and New Divisions. 31.07.2025. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-oldproblems-and-new-divisions/>.
- ²⁶ Bozkurt, Abdülgani, *Müslüman Kardeşler; Siyasal Meşruiyet ve Seçimler*, Ürdün Üzerine Bir, 2021.
- ²⁷ Bozkurt, Abdülgani, Mehmet Rakipoğlu, *Müslüman Kardeşler Teşkilatı*, Ketebe Yayınları, İstanbul, 2023.
- ²⁸ Lacroix, Stéphane, Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood Predicament. *Pomapes Briefings*, 31, 2017.
- ²⁹ Although the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia declared that his country was returning to "Moderate Islam" in 2017, this discourse was mostly interpreted as his country's policy of opposing the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Indeed, after this statement by the Crown Prince, the Saudi state apparatus continued to support the status quo Salafi ideology throughout the region. Mandaville, 2022.
- ³⁰ Boran, T. K, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde Türkiye-İsrail ilişkileri. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 22(44), 2002, pp. 28-42.
- ³¹ Mandaville, Peter, Wahhabism and the World. Peter Mandaville (Ed). *Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam*, Oxford University Press, London, 2022, pp/ 3-34.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Topçu, İ, Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinin İlk Yılları (1948-1952). *History Studies*, 10(2), 2018, pp. 161-175.
- ³⁴ Ceylan Ersoy, T. 2022. Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Yeni Dönem. 12.01.2025. www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/turkiye-israil-iliskilerinde-yeni-donem/2711497.
- ³⁵ The first Turkish Chief of Staff to visit Israel officially, I. Hakki Karadayi is also known as one of the leading actors of the February 28, 1997 post-modern coup. The Welfare-Path Government led by N. Erbakan, which developed relations with the Middle East and Arab countries, has experienced crises with Israel many times, especially because of its attitude towards the Palestinian cause. So much so that after the "Jerusalem Night" program organized by the Welfare Party (RP) Ankara-Sincan Mayor B. Yıldız, Israel made harsh statements against Turkey. The TAF, on the other hand, made tanks march through the streets of Sincan and made the footsteps of the coup heard. Of course, this should not lead one to believe that the TAF has always displayed a pro-Israeli attitude. Because, during the reign of another junta administration, K. Evren, relations between Turkey and Israel experienced one of the worst periods in history. During his visit to Arab countries, the Chief of Staff of the period, K. Evren, stated that Israel was the biggest problem for the Middle East region. As a result of the harsh reactions of the USA and Israel to K. Evren's statements, diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Israel were reduced to the second secretary level on November 26, 1980 (Zürcher, 2020).
- ³⁶ Gök, H, *Türkiye-İsrail İlişkileri (2002-2011)* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, T.C. Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı) Erişim Adresi, 2021.
- ³⁷ VOA. 2023a. Erdoğan'ın "İsrail'e karşı sertleşen söylemi" İslami kesimde nasıl karşılık buldu? 11.01.2025. www.voaturkce.com/a/erdoganin-israile-karsi-sertlesen-soylemi-islami-kesimde-nasil-karsilik-buldu/7327235.html.
- ³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Gündüz, U., & Arıkan, İ, Türk-İsrail krizlerinin Türk medyasında temsil örneklerinin Fairclough'ın söylem analizi ile okunması. *İnönü Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Elektronik Dergisi (İnif E-Dergi)*, 3(2), 2018, pp. 151-174.

⁴⁰ BBC. 2010. Türkiye'yle İsrail arasındaki koltuk krizi, 03.07.2025. www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2010/01/100112_turkey_israel.

⁴¹ İnât, K. vd. 2017. *AK Parti'nin 15 Yılı*. Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA) Yayınları, İstanbul.

⁴² Milliyet. 2011. Koltuk krizi kasıtlı değildi büyükelçiye şaka yaptım. 03.07.2025. www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/koltuk-krizi-kasitli-degildi-buyukelciye-saka-yaptim-1406077.

⁴³ CNN. 2011. Erdoğan: "Mavi Marmara saldırı savaş nedeni", 03.07.2025. www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/erdogan-mavi-marmaraya-saldiri-savas-nedeni.

⁴⁴ This organization, which was attended by activists from many countries around the world, including Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Austria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen and Egypt, included approximately twenty members of parliament, more than sixty members of the international press, many artists and Nobel Peace Prize-winning activists, with the aim of breaking the blockade that Israel aims to turn Gaza into an open-air prison and making the voice of the Palestinian people heard by humanity, AA, 2022.

⁴⁵ BBC. 2011. Türkiye'den İsrail'e Mavi Marmara tepkisi. 03.07.2025. www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2011/09/110902_turkey_israel.

⁴⁶ BBC. 2013. Mavi Marmara: İsrail, Türkiye'den özür diledi. 03.07.2025. www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/03/130322_israil_turkiye_ozur.

⁴⁷ Kaşani, V, *Filistin İslami Direniş ve Aksa Tufanı*, El-Mustafa Yayınları. 1. Baskı, İstanbul, 2023.

⁴⁸ In the report titled "Why We Triggered the Flood at Al-Aqsa" published by Hamas, these attacks were evaluated as a necessary step and a natural reaction against the policy and cruelty of Israel to destroy the Palestinian cause that it has been implementing for years, and three thousand Palestinian resistance fighters infiltrated Israel with unmanned aerial vehicles, paramotors, paragliders, motorcycles and speedboats (Independent, 2023; BBC, 2023a). These attacks, in which many Israeli soldiers were killed and taken hostage, revealed that Israel's "unbreakable" security wall and its intelligence network, which is effective all over the world, are not as strong as they were thought. Because, what Israel lost more than the loss of life and property in this process is the beginning of the disappearance of the perception of the "powerful country" it created all over the world.

⁴⁹ Mucuk, H., Özdemir, H. ve Anik, M. A, El-Aksa Tufanı operasyonu ve Türkiye'de kamuoyunun Filistin algısı. *Fikriyat Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 3(2), 2023, pp. 101-118.

⁵⁰ Rudaw. 2023. İsrail'in 11 Eylül'ü: Hamas'ın Aksa Tufanı operasyonu. 11.01.2025. www.rudaw.net/turkish/kurdistan/101020231.

⁵¹ Erol, A, Evanjelikler, küreselleşmeciler, siyonistler bağlamında Gazze üzerine bir deneme. *Uluslararası Akademik Birikim Dergisi*, 6(5), 2023, pp. 1104-1115.

⁵² AA. 2023. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, İsrail Başbakanı Netanyahu'yu kabul etti. 11.01.2025. www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-israil-basbakani-netanyahuyu-kabul-etti/2996348.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Independent. 2023. Hamas raporunun tam metni: "Aksa Tufanı'nı neden yaptık". 11.01.2025. www.indyturk.com/node/692506/d%C3%BCnya/hamas-raporunun-tam-metni-aksa-tufan%C4%B1n%C4%B1-neden-yapt%C4%B1k#google_vignette.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ TRT Haber. 2023. İsrail menşeli ürünler için boykot kararı. 12.01.2025. www.trthaber.com/haber/guncel/israil-menseli-urunler-icin-boykot-karari-810236.html.

⁵⁷ Toğa, O. *İran Basınında Aksa Tufanı Operasyonu ve Türkiye*. 1. Baskı. İran Araştırmaları Merkezi (İRAM) Yayınları, İstanbul, 2023.

⁵⁸ NY Times. 2024. As Turkey Cuts Trade Ties, Israel's Isolation Grows. 12.01.2025. www.nytimes.com/2024/05/03/world/middleeast/turkey-israel-gaza-cease-fire.html.

⁵⁹ Özer, Ç., Uluslararası Politika Açısından Filistin Sorunu. *Küllîye*, 2023, pp. 582-605.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Arı, T., *Geçmişten Günümüze Ortadoğu*. Alfa Akademi, 2017.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Özer, Ç., Uluslararası Politika Açısından Filistin Sorunu. *Küllîye*, 2023, pp. 582-605.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ One of the important actors of the February 28 post-modern coup, the then TSK General Staff Deputy Chief Ç. Bir, stated in the article titled Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel, which he wrote together with M. Sherman in 2002, that as a result of N. Erbakan becoming prime minister, Israeli interests and the soundness of relations between Turkey and Israel were in danger. Therefore, stating that this danger was warded off by the TSK with the post-modern coup, Ç. Bir said, "If we had not kept the Islamist Erbakan under control with the coup, relations between Turkey and Israel would have been greatly damaged", Bir and Sherman, 2002.

⁷¹ The expression "Palestine Issue", which is used in written and visual press, academic studies and daily speech, to express the disagreements between Palestine and Israel and even to express Palestine's rightful struggle, has not been specifically included in this study. Because this expression can cause a perception that Palestine is the sole source of the troubles experienced in the region. For this reason, throughout the study, the explanation sentences regarding Palestine are expressed as "Palestine issue", "Palestine issue". What is meant by these expressions is the struggle for existence that Palestine is waging against Israel in its own lands, Altunışık, 2010.

References

AA. 2021. İsrail'e karşı 2000 yılında başlayan İkinci İntifada'nın üzerinden 21 yıl geçti, 31.07.2025. www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/israile-karsi-2000-yilinda-baslayan-ikinci-intifadanin-uzerinden-21-yil-gecti/2377014

AA. 2022. Mavi Marmara saldırısının 12'nci yılı nedeniyle Fatih'te yürüyüş yapıldı. 31.07.2025. www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/mavi-marmara-saldirisinin-12inci-yili-nedeniyle-fatih-te-yuruyus-yapildi/2602532

AA. 2023. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, İsrail Başbakanı Netanyahu'yu kabul etti. 11.01.2025. www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-israil-basbakani-netanyahuyu-kabul-etti/2996348

Acar, Necmettin. 2018. "Arap Baharı Sürecinde Ortadoğu'da Güvenlik ve Dış Politika: Suudi Arabistan Örneği," *Birey ve Toplum* 8, no. 16: 139-171.

Al-Anani, Halil. 2021. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Old Problems and New Divisions. 31.07.2025. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-oldproblems-and-new-divisions/>

Almog O. & Sever, A. 2017. "Hide and seek? Israeli-Turkish relations and the Baghdad Pact," *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 4: 609-623.

Altunışık, M. 2010. *Arap dünyasında Türkiye algısı* (1. baskı). TESEV Yayınları.

Arı, T. 2017. *Geçmişten Günümüze Ortadoğu*. Alfa Akademi.

Başkan, Birol. 2021. *The Politics of İslam*. Edinburgh University Press.

- BBC. 2010. Türkiye'yle İsrail arasında koltuk krizi, 03.07.2025.
www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2010/01/100112_turkey_israel
- BBC. 2011. Türkiye'den İsrail'e Mavi Marmara tepkisi. 03.07.2025.
www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2011/09/110902_turkey_israel.
- BBC. 2013. Mavi Marmara: İsrail, Türkiye'den özür diledi. 03.07.2025.
www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2013/03/130322_israil_turkiye_ozur
- BBC. 2023a. Hamas'ın İsrail savunma sistemini aşmak için kullandığı motorlu paraşütler hakkında ne biliniyor? 31.07.2025.
www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c03e6xklp92o
- Bijan, A. ve Ejazi, E. 2022. The Perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Settlement in the Post-Arab Spring. Nesrin Kenar (Ed). *Contemporary Issues in The Balkans, Middle East, Asia & Africa* içinde (s. 217-233). London: IJOPEC Publication.
- Bir, Ç., & Sherman, M. 2002. "Formula for stability: Turkey plus Israel," *Middle East Quarterly* 4, no. 9: 23-32.
- Boran, T. K. 2020. "Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde Türkiye-İsrail ilişkileri," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 22, no. 44: 28-42.
- Bozkurt, Abdülğani, Mehmet Rakipoğlu. 2023. *Müslüman Kardeşler Teşkilatı*. İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınları.
- Bozkurt, Abdülğani. 2021. *Müslüman Kardeşler, Siyasal Meşruiyet ve Seçimler*. Ürdün: Üzerine Bir
- Cafero, Giorgio. 2019. Bahrain unsurprisingly supports Israeli aggression. TRT World. 31.07.2025.
<https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/bahrain-unsurprisingly-supports-israeli-aggression->
- Cafero, Giorgio. 2023, 29 Ağust. Sudan'da Suudi Arabistan-BAE rekabeti şiddetleniyor. *Mepa News*. 31.07.2025.
<https://www.mepanews.com/sudanda-suudi-arabistan-bae-rekabetisiddetleniyor->
- Ceylan Ersoy, T. 2022. Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Yeni Dönem. 12.01.2025.
www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/turkiye-israil-iliskilerinde-yeni-donem/2711497
- CNN. 2011. Erdoğan: "Mavi Marmara saldırı savaş nedeni", 03.07.2025.
www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/erdogan-mavi-marmaraya-saldiri-savas-nedeni
- CNN. 2023. Gulf states have given billions in aid to Egypt. Now they want to see returns. 31.07.2025.
<https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/01/business/egypt-gulf-states-aid-mimeintl/index.html>
- Çavuşoğlu, Esra. 2022. "Körfez Ülkeleri ve Filistin: Güçlü Tarihsel Bağlar Temelinde Körfez Siyaseti," *Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 8, no. 2: 15-33.
- Çınkara, G., & Coşkun, B. 2023b. "Mapping the Genesis of the Abraham Accords," *Insight Turkey* 5, no. 2: 63-77.
- Erol, A. 2023. "Evanjelistler, küreselleşmeciler, siyonistler bağlamında Gazze üzerine bir deneme," *Uluslararası Akademik Birikim Dergisi* 6, no. 5: 1104-1115.
- Euro News. 2023a. Türkiye-İsrail ekonomik ilişkileri ne durumda, ticaret hacmi AK Parti iktidarında nasıl değişti? 12.01.2025.
www.tr.euronews.com/2023/10/11/turkiye-israil-ekonomik-iliskileri-ne-durumda-ticaret-hacmi-ak-parti-iktidarinda-nasil-deg
- Gök, H. 2021. *Türkiye-İsrail İlişkileri (2002-2011)* (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, T.C. Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı) Erişim Adresi:
- Gündüz, U., & Arıkan, İ. 2018. "Türk-İsrail krizlerinin Türk medyasında temsil örneklerinin Fairclough'ın söylem analizi ile okunması," *İnönü Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Elektronik Dergisi (İnif E-Dergi)* 3, no. 2: 151-174.

- Independent. 2023. Hamas raporunun tam metni: “Aksa Tufanı’nı neden yaptık”. 11.01.2025.
www.indyrturk.com/node/692506/d%C3%BCn%C3%BCn%C3%BCn/hamas-raporunun-tam-metni-aksa-tufan%C4%B1n%C4%B1-neden-yapt%C4%B1k#google_vignette
- İnat, K. vd. 2017. *AK Parti’nin 15 Yılı*. Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA) Yayınları, İstanbul.
- Kaşani, V. 2023. *Filistin İslami Direniş ve Aksa Tufanı*, El-Mustafa Yayınları. 1. Baskı. İstanbul.
- Kemiksiz, Neşe. 2018. “Arap-İsrail Sorunu ve Bölgesel Yansımaları,” *Journal of Awareness (JoA)*, 3(Special), 127-144.
- Kılıç, Fatih. 2019 Arap Baharı Sonrası Mısır. Cüneyit Özşahin ve Orhan Batır (Ed). *Arap Baharı sonrası Ortadoğu: Bölgesel dönüşüm ve Reaksiyonlar* içinde (s. 85-112). İstanbul: Hiperyayın.
- Kocatepe, Damla. 2017. “Suudi Arabistan-İran Rekabeti: Mezhep Görünümlü Çıkar Çatışması,” *Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi* 1, no. 2: 67-101.
- Lacroix, Stéphane. 2017. Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament. *Pomapes Briefings*, 31.
- Lund, Aron. 2019. From cold war to civil war: 75 years of Russian-Syrian relations. *The Swedish Institute of International Affairs*, 39.
- Mandaville, Peter. 2022. Wahhabism and the World. Peter Mandaville (Ed). *Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia’s Global Influence on Islam* (pp. 3-34). London: Oxford University Press.
- Mercan, Muhammet H. 2021. The adventure of Islamism in Egypt: A political system-based analysis. Lütif Sunar (Ed). *The Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Muslim Socio-Political Thought* içinde (ss. 143-155). London: Routledge.
- Milliyet. 2011. Koltuk krizi kasıtlı değildi büyükelçiye şaka yaptım. 03.07.2025.
www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/koltuk-krizi-kasitli-degildi-buyukelciye-saka-yaptim-1406077
- Mucuk, H., Özdemir, H. ve Anık, M. A. 2023. El-Aksa Tufanı operasyonu ve Türkiye’de kamuoyunun Filistin algısı. *Fikriyat Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2: 101-118.
- NY Times. 2024. As Turkey Cuts Trade Ties, Israel’s Isolation Grows. 12.01.2025.
www.nytimes.com/2024/05/03/world/middleeast/turkey-israel-gaza-cease-fire.html
- Özer, Ç. 2023. Uluslararası Politika Açısından Filistin Sorunu. *Küllîye*, 582-605.
- Rudaw. 2023. İsrail’in 11 Eylül’ü: Hamas’ın Aksa Tufanı operasyonu. 11.01.2025.
www.rudaw.net/turkish/kurdistan/101020231
- Telli Azime. 2020. *Başarısız Devlet Terminolojisi Üzerinden Arap Baharı*, Libya: nı Okumak Mısır
- Toğa, O. 2023. *İran Basınında Aksa Tufanı Operasyonu ve Türkiye*. 1. Baskı. İran Araştırmaları Merkezi (İRAM) Yayınları. İstanbul.
- Topçu, İ. 2018. “Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinin İlk Yılları (1948-1952),” *History Studies* 10, no. 2: 161-175.
- TRT Haber. 2023. İsrail menşeli ürünler için boykot kararı. 12.01.2025.
www.trthaber.com/haber/guncel/israil-menseli-urunler-icin-boykot-karari-810236.html
- VOA. 2023a. Erdoğan’ın “İsrail’e karşı sertleşen söylemi” İslami kesimde nasıl karşılık buldu? 11.01.2025.
www.voaturkce.com/a/erdoganin-israile-karsi-sertlesen-soylemi-islami-kesimde-nasil-karsilik-buldu/7327235.html
- Yeltin, H. 2021. “Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Son Dönem Krizleri: Türk Muhalefetine ve Kamuoyunun Yaklaşımı,” *Artuklu Kaime Uluslararası Artuklu İktisadi ve İdari Araştırmalar Dergisi* 4, no. 1: 1-33.
- Zürcher E. J. 2020. *Trans. Yasemin Saner. Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi*. 4. Basım. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.