

***YUHONG Li**
JUNZE Feng
ANGUANG Zheng
Nanjing University, China

A STUDY ON THE ADAPTABILITY OF SECURITY NORMS IN ASEAN STATES AFTER THE COLD WAR: A SOCIAL EVOLUTION ANALYSIS

Based on the theory of social evolution, this paper attempts to explain the changes in the adaptation of ASEAN states to security norms since the cold war. After the end of the cold war, the ASEAN states did not immediately adopt the ASEAN Framework for security cooperation, but still followed a certain degree of survival instinct. With the strengthening of ASEAN's normative power, the situation of security cooperation between Southeast Asia and other major states in the region has begun to be dominated by ASEAN. This change has not only led to changes in the security habits of ASEAN states but also prompted ASEAN states to gradually adapt to the security norms based on the ASEAN Framework. The changes in the adaptability of ASEAN states to security norms illustrate the fact that ASEAN norms are spread from another perspective, and also show the reasons why ASEAN can advance towards a security community. On the whole, the development of security norms of ASEAN states after the cold war shows a direction of social evolution, and it is a kind of convergent evolution. With the influence of the external environment, ASEAN states "choose" ASEAN norms to obtain security, and the ASEAN Security Community finally becomes a form of "inheritance".

Keywords: social evolution, ASEAN norms, security norms, Southeast Asia

Introduction

Regulation has always been an important issue in international politics. The main idealism of early times was how to build an international community that could avoid war. Since US President Bill Wilson's 14-point Plan revealed the importance of morals, freedom, democracy, and other values in shaping a peaceful international order, most international relations scholars have begun to focus on international norms. As an integration cooperation organization in Southeast Asia, ASEAN dominates the political, economic, cultural, and other orders of Southeast Asia. As a security norm, the ASEAN norm is characterized by a decision-making process characterized by high consultation, wide consensus, and an autonomous, informal, and non-confrontation-based

regional cooperation process, which is mostly used on issues such as non-use of force, peaceful dispute settlement, regional autonomy, and collective self-help. ¹However, many scholars still question the effectiveness of the ASEAN norm, and this paper holds that whether a specification is effective by complying with thrust (a kind of compliance pull), and although the actor may choose to violate the rule or norm, it can survive if it retains a sense of status (or a sense of standing). Compliance with thrust causes the offender to develop a legitimate strategy (justificatory strategy) for their behavior. Even if someone has violated it, it entices actors to follow rules or norms in the future.²

However, at present, the academic community has less considered the adaptability of Southeast Asian states to ASEAN norms. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has covered most Southeast Asian states, but why does it still have synchronized synchronization in security cognition? The close connection between ASEAN from the end of the Cold War to the present day shows that in the process of adaptation to ASEAN norms in Southeast Asian states in the post-cold war period, there should be a change from an adaptation to a great adaptation. Proposing a kind of analytical framework, this paper will explain the changing process of norms adaptation in ASEAN states, which is reflected in the change in security concepts. However, the ASEAN norms are manifested by the informal system, and the academic community has not concluded whether the security concept of ASEAN states is influenced by the ASEAN norms. This paper will examine the concept of legal adaptability with the definition of Philippe Bourbeau's concept of resilience.

In short, he believes that the adaptability of laws (or norms) is mainly reflected in whether the law (or norms) can well balance the gap between flexibility and stability. Philippe Bourbeau defines normative fitness as resilience, which can be divided into three aspects: the first is maintenance, which consumes resources and energy to maintain the status quo; the second is marginality, which means that the actor responds within the boundaries of current policies, norms, or social structure; the last is a renewal, which changes existing policy assumptions, sets new governance goals and reshapes social structure.³

Comparing the Chinese and western definitions of normative adaptability, this paper defines normative adaptability as whether a specification can strike a balance between flexibility and stability, and presents a certain nature of "maintaining the status quo", "positive response" and "reshaping the social structure".

Because of the adaptability of ASEAN security norms this paper, can be roughly divided into two categories: "research on ASEAN norms" and "research on adaptability". In the first category of research, Amitav Acharya discussed the constructivism of the politics, economy, and security of Southeast Asia, and proposed the concept of a "security community". He believes that the construction of identity and norms makes ASEAN one of

the most successful regional organizations in developing states.⁴ Shaun Narine and Sronia Estrella D. Solidum both discussed the political and economic and historical changes in Southeast Asia with ASEAN as the center.⁵ Sarah Easton and Richard Stubbs distinguish neorealism from the constructionist dynamics of ASEAN and argue that ASEAN mechanisms are fragile.⁶ From a neoliberal perspective, Kawasaki believes that the formation of ASEAN was caused by “collective interests”.⁷ In the study of the ASEAN norms itself, Mark Benson discussed some issues of the ASEAN approach, which helped to think about the operation of the ASEAN norms.⁸ Alex discusses the effectiveness and lack of ASEAN security management from a pacifist perspective, arguing that ASEAN is unable to handle the rising nationalism caused by the economic downturn.⁹ Nischalke sees ASEAN as a community of rules, not a community of identity.¹⁰ The above scholars have analyzed the connection between ASEAN and ASEAN norms from different perspectives, but they lack the investigation of safety norms in different periods of Southeast Asia and the analysis of the transmission power of ASEAN norms.

In terms of Chinese scholars, most Chinese scholars focus on the study of the ASEAN region. Bin Xiao discussed the interaction between ASEAN and the EU, combined with theory and empirical evidence.¹¹ But with a less comprehensive investigation of theory, history and reality. From the perspective of world system theory and international political economy, Zhengyi Wang discussed Southeast Asian regionalism and focused on the “social shift” of regionalism.¹² Chen Zhao and Yunhua Cao systematically investigated the operation mode of ASEAN.¹³ Shilu Wang and Guoping Wang studied the 30 years of ASEAN.¹⁴ Shaolian Liao, Wen Chen, Hong Zhao, Qin Li, and others had a comprehensive discussion on the regional economic cooperation in ASEAN.¹⁵ Min Wei, Zichang Wang, and Youxin Guo respectively inspected the regionalism of ASEAN from nationalism, system, interests, and sovereign security.¹⁶

Taiwan scholar Ruyu Lin discussed the political, economic, and social aspects of the formation of the ASEAN security community, saying that the formation of ASEAN experience has a great role in the community, but the internal development of ASEAN is relatively different, and ASEAN norms may encounter bottlenecks.¹⁷ Guangsheng Lu analyzed the regional economic cooperation led by ASEAN with the international political economy. He believes that ASEAN’s economic cooperation has special norms and principles, to pursue national and regional interests.¹⁸ Xianwu Zheng did a comprehensive investigation of the history, theory, and reality of southeast Asia, contributing a lot to the regional research, and analyzed the regional research frontier. He saw the ASEAN norms as a weak security mechanism, but this mechanism turned strong when cooperating with foreign powers.¹⁹ Fan Jiang analyzed it in a nationalist way. He pointed out that the emergence and change of ASEAN norms are due to the pursuit of marginal benefit and utility maximization of

ASEAN states, and the role of ASEAN norms contributes to the political union and coordination conflict among member states.²⁰

On the whole, domestic scholars fill the gap in the research of foreign scholars, but Chinese scholars lack to investigate the adaptability of the analysis of ASEAN security norms. Most scholars regard the post-Cold War ASEAN security norms as the same state but ignore the fact that ASEAN states' adaptability to security norms is a dynamic process.

In the second type of research, most scholars only analyze the normative adaptability of the EU, starting from the question of how the adaptability of the norms changes. David Chandler defines adaptability/resilience as "the ability of an actor to actively or successfully adapt to external threats or the ability to deal with problems," but he does not analyze the changes in adaptability. Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, and Chris C. Demchak examine adaptability and find that adaptability can have positive effects. They argue that the key to adaptability lies in the system's internal perceptual ability to exceed other interfering variables, prompting the system to automatically correct to the adaptive state.²¹ Other scholars are more discussed from the perspective of security governance. From the perspective of security governance, Elke Krahnemann and Mark Webber discussed how the state and international mechanisms participated in the process of governance under the security structure of the post-Cold War period.

To sum up, in addition to focusing more on the EU, most scholars still cannot explain how the adaptability of norms changes. Scholars only believe that the adaptive changes come from the passive acceptance of external shocks, such as the refugee issues and the European debt crisis. In addition, scholars do not explain how individuals (or states) adapt to collective (or community) norms, and how this adaptive transition process occurs.

In terms of Chinese scholars, few studies have analyzed adaptability systematically and paid less attention to this issue in China. Xiaoxiao Yan combs the western research on resilience and explains the development process of western resilience. He believes that the development of integration in the West, especially in the EU, ignores the balance between individuals (or states) and the collective (or the EU). The EU tries to ask the Member States to share responsibility through an expression of resilience, which further strengthens the stability of the Community²². Zishi Guo and Yousheng Hong examined the resilience of NATO. They believe that NATO is gradually turning to the benchmark requirements of resilience to strengthen its response to external threats when overall security cannot be achieved. At the same time, the shift in resilience also means that the EU is starting to move toward a more robust diplomatic strategy, no longer idealized in considering homogeneous overall security²³.

On the whole, neither foreign scholars nor Chinese scholars can well explain why the adaptation of ASEAN norms, and how a country changes its security concept in the process of adapting to the norms. At present, scholars have no way to explain the correlation between national autonomy and normative adaptability. Based on this, this paper will analyze the adaptability changes of ASEAN states in the post-Cold War period to make up for the lack of academic research on normative adaptability.

The Social Evolution Logic of Norms Adaptability

Specification adaptability refers to whether a specification can strike a balance between flexibility and stability, showing a certain nature of “maintaining the status quo”, “positive response” and “reshaping the social structure”. How a state adapts to a norm is largely reflected in whether the national security concept is affected by this norm and then changes. However, in the process of adapting to the norms, the country has a certain autonomy. This autonomy is also closely related to the external environment, so this paper will take Tang’s theory of social evolution as the analytical framework to discuss the causal relationship between the change in the external environment and the autonomy of the country’s adaptation to norms.

Tang proposed a theory of social evolution in his book *The Social Evolution of International Politics from 8,000 BC to the Future*. He believed that the impetus of the international structural transition was consistent with the survival mechanism of biology, and so he redefined the “variation” - “selection” - “genetic” mechanism of biology.

In terms of “variation” mechanisms, he regarded the idea of specific institutional arrangements as genes and institutions as a genetic phenotype. Since the germination of ideas involves consciousness, the mutation in social evolution in the concept dimension (that is, the new concept) is not random, but the concept produced by the individual (country) based on solving specific problems and striving for specific goals.²⁴ That is to say, the country must face specific problems due to environmental changes, and the choice between the old and the new ideas gradually forms within the country.

In terms of the “choice” mechanism, Tang believes that the choice of what ideas can exist cannot do without the support of social power and that people with greater power may decide to spread or stifle certain ideas. Existing ideas, especially those that have been dogmatic, often have the power to support them and have a huge impact on the new ideas (genetic) adaptability.²⁵ In short, when the state chooses new or old ideas, who can be chosen is based mainly on the judgment of the person in power.

In terms of “genetic” mechanisms, he believes that there is no obstacle that the genes (such as ideas) and phenotypes (such as institutions, and culture) of acquired traits can be passed directly on to the next generation. At the same

time, genetic mechanisms are divided into two types. One is longitudinal inheritance, which occurs within individuals and continuously forms groups with consolidated genes with the help of historical memory and education. The other is lateral inheritance, which occurs among individuals and is formed by constantly receiving external unsafe signals.²⁶

However, Tang only investigated the international structure and did not analyze the normative structure and the normative adaptability of the country. To this end, this paper will analyze the adaptability of security norms in ASEAN states based on the theory of social evolution. First, this paper assumes the normative adaptive phenomenon in ASEAN states and confirms that the adaptive changes in ASEAN states do exist. second, this paper will examine the change in normative adaptability of ASEAN states in different periods from the post-Cold War to the present period.

First, based on the fact of the development of ASEAN after the Cold War to today, this paper assumes that the period from the end of the Cold War to the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2003 is a period of “mutation”. There are two conceptual groups within ASEAN member states: “states that follow the individual survival instinct” and “states that obey the ASEAN framework”. These conceptual groups gradually transform their ideas into foreign policy, forming two traits, namely, “loose security alliance” and “close security alliance”. These two traits also represent different situations that ASEAN states are adaptable to security norms and are more adapted to a certain nature of security norms. “Free security alliance” is more adaptable to “the flexibility of ASEAN norms”; “close security alliance” is more adapted to “ASEAN norms and stability”.

Second, from the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 to the construction document of the ASEAN Political and Security Community in 2015, it belongs to the role period of the “choice” mechanism. The change in international structure promotes the gradual expansion of the advantages of choosing “states that obey the ASEAN framework”, and the expansion of the advantages drive the spread of ASEAN norms. At the same time, it also symbolizes the victory of the “close security alliance” adapted to the “norms and stability of ASEAN” in the competition for survival, and moving towards the “loose security community”.

Moreover, from the introduction of the construction document of the ASEAN Political and Security Community in 2015 to the promulgation of the Will of the ASEAN Community after 2025 in 2020, it belongs to the function period of the “genetic” mechanism. The behavior of “states that follow the ASEAN framework” gradually became a habit and circulated among ASEAN members in the form of historical memory. The adaptability of ASEAN norms has been further deepened, making ASEAN states a close security community. The advantage of a “loose security community” continues to emerge, moving toward a “close security community”.

In addition, the changes in the adaptability to security norms will be reflected in the interaction between security concepts and international structure and ASEAN, so the adaptability of ASEAN states has four situations; altruism or altruism in the international structure, and egoism or altruism in the ASEAN framework. The four situations represent different adaptive behaviors, namely, “loose security alliance”, “tight security alliance”, “loose security community”, and “tight security community”. “Loose security alliance” is the country chooses to maintain egoism in the international structure and the ASEAN framework, states mainly with their security concept, ASEAN norms are only partially observed; “close security alliance” is the country chooses altruism in the international structure, but chooses egoism under the ASEAN framework. states mainly adopt the mutual security concept, and the ASEAN norms are observed; the “loose security community” means that states choose egoism in the international structure, but they choose altruism under the ASEAN framework. The country focuses on its security concept, and the influence of ASEAN norms has increased. The “close security community” means that states focus on altruism in the international structure and under the ASEAN framework, states focus on the mutual security concept, and ASEAN norms become a system.

Assumption of ASEAN countries’ adaptive behavior to safety norms (Self-drawn by author)

	Self-egoism under the ASEAN framework	Altruism under the ASEAN framework
Self-interest in the international community (Individual survival instinct)	China focuses on its security concept, and ASEAN norms are only partially observed. (The Loose Security Alliance)	The country focuses on its security concept, and the influence of ASEAN norms has increased. (The Loose Security Community)
Altruism in the international community (Collective survival instinct)	States focus on each other’s security concepts, and ASEAN norms have been observed. (Close Security Alliance)	States mainly focus on mutual security concepts, and ASEAN norms have become a system. (Close Security Community)

The Adaptation of ASEAN Security Norms in the Post-Cold War Period

Since 1984, with the influence of ASEAN, the strength gradually increased, and some non-member Southeast Asian states began to join. In terms of national form, the Southeast Asian Security Community to expand the community and move towards the direction of “Greater ASEAN”, especially in terms of increasing intervention costs, and solving the problems of Cambodia and Myanmar it proves that ASEAN norms have the same security normative effect as non-member states, thus further enhancing the intervention of Southeast Asian states. In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia on a large scale and controlled a large number of Cambodian territories, which posed a challenge to ASEAN norms. Broken the principles of “peaceful settlement of disputes”, “mutual non-use of force”, “non-interference in internal affairs” and “regional autonomy” have been broken, causing ASEAN states not to be full and worried. In dealing with the Cambodian issue, major differences occurred within ASEAN. One faction is represented by Thailand, Singapore, and other states, it is believed that due to practical security problems, ASEAN norms need to be adjusted to intervene in Cambodia.²⁷

Another faction is dominated by Indonesia and Malaysia, and hopes to continue to maintain the principle of “regional autonomy”. As far as Cambodia is concerned, if Vietnam is recognized. The aggression of the South symbolizes the retrogression of the regional political structure and may return to the “defensive realism world”. To avoid this In 1979, ASEAN Foreign Ministers convened a special meeting and stated several principles.²⁸

1. Deplores the armed interference in Cambodia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity
2. Reaffirming the process of the Cambodian people’s exercise of their right to self-determination. The power to decide the future without the influence or interference of external forces
3. Call on foreign troops to withdraw from Cambodia
4. Urges The UN Security Council take appropriate measures to restore peace, security and stability in the region

At the beginning of the end of the Cold War, ASEAN faced a series of challenges, in terms of the nature and form of its challenges, which it had not experienced in the 25 years since its birth.²⁹ ASEAN states are becoming aware of the advantages of acting as a collective in international politics, and are determined to maintain ASEAN’s functioning as a normal institution.³⁰ Before the end of the Cold War, there was only one norm among Southeast Asian states, namely egoism based on survival instinct, embodied in political, military, and ideological confrontation. At this time, both in the international

structure and the ASEAN framework, Southeast Asian states adopt self-interested uncooperative behavior. The concept of following the survival instinct has long existed and has become the consensus of Southeast Asian states.

After the end of the Cold War, the external environment changed dramatically, and global economic and technological cooperation flourished. At the beginning of the end of the Cold War, the large European market and the North American Free Trade Area have initially taken shape. The mutation of the external environment has made the concept of Southeast Asian states “change” and a new concept appear. In addition to the original concept of compliance with the survival instinct, the concept of compliance with the ASEAN framework has also emerged.³¹ Once states comply with the framework of ASEAN, ASEAN has normative powers, and becomes the advocate and convergence of norms (norm brewery).³² In other words, within the framework of ASEAN, the diffusion of norms is two-way, including the external diffusion of ASEAN norms, namely the regionalization and trans-regionalization of ASEAN norms, and the internal diffusion of international norms, namely the localization of international norms. A typical text of the “variation” in this concept is the Singapore Declaration (Singapore Declaration Of 1992 Singapore) signed by ASEAN states in January 1992. In terms of the political and security cooperation framework, the Singapore Declaration embodies the expansion of horizontal and vertical ASEAN security norms. On the longitudinal extension of the ASEAN norm, the Singapore Declaration encourages Southeast Asian states and ASEAN states to join the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; on the lateral extension of the ASEAN specification, the Singapore Declaration stressed the need to play not only the role of the ASEAN Ministerial Conference in strengthening internal exchanges among ASEAN states.

Moreover, we should take ASEAN as a platform, to include states from outside the region into the ASEAN security cooperation framework, strengthening the stability of ASEAN security norms, even if complete security cooperation among ASEAN states.³³ However, ASEAN can use this platform to achieve security cooperation with some states outside the region, if there is a sovereignty dispute between the Philippines and Vietnam in the Nansha Islands, the degree of cooperation between the two states is extremely limited, the Philippines also expects to cooperate with major powers outside the region.²⁸ As a result, some altruism in the international structure and self-interest among the states within ASEAN has emerged.

Since the Singapore Declaration in 1992, the new concept of observing the “variation” of the ASEAN framework has continued to grow. The four Indochina Peninsula states have successively joined ASEAN, and ASEAN has established dialogue partnerships with ten states outside the region. The concept of abiding by the ASEAN framework is gradually institutionalized.

The ASEAN Regional Forum system established in 1994 has become an effective mechanism for security cooperation and consultation between ASEAN states and major states outside the region. By establishing the three major mechanisms of trust, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution, the ASEAN Regional Forum has established an institutional framework of the regional security structure and become a platform for the interaction of regional states.³⁵ Since then, a series of international organizations and forums have been firmly locked into the institutional framework, and alleviated the “institutional surplus” through functional overlap and supplement, making a series of systems operate effectively and orderly at the bilateral and multilateral levels.³⁶ However, at this time, the ASEAN institutional framework was not effective and was even dismissed as a “talk shop” (talk shop), and some regional core security issues, such as the North Korea and Taiwan issues, were not included. ASEAN has also been committed to expanding the effectiveness of the ASEAN institutional framework and striving to shape a regional security environment with the ASEAN Regional Forum.³⁷ For example, the chairman of the second ASEAN Regional Forum in 1995 called on ASEAN to be the core driving force of Asia-Pacific cooperation. In addition, the concept of survival instinct and refusal to join the institutional framework remains strong. Take Myanmar as an example. Although Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, and ASEAN has tried to make constructive contact with it, Myanmar has always been resistant to ASEAN norms and systems and has refused to cooperate with ASEAN states, which has seriously damaged ASEAN’s international status.³⁸ In the first decade of joining ASEAN, Myanmar preferred to cooperate with other states outside the region (such as India) rather than with ASEAN states under the ASEAN framework.

Since 1992, Myanmar has been an important target of India’s “eastward” policy, with a series of institutionalized talks, including but not limited to the ministerial meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Indo-Myanmar local talks, and the Army Commander-level border liaison officers meeting. After Myanmar accedes to ASEAN, the diplomatic exchanges and cooperation talks between India and Myanmar continue to heat up. In 2000, Myanmar Vice President Maung Aye visited India; in 2001, Indian Foreign Minister Singh; in 2003, Indian Vice President Ali Shekavat, and in 2004, Myanmar President Dan of State met to hold consultations on strengthening political security and economic cooperation. During this period, India and Myanmar have carried out joint military exercises and intelligence exchange work in the traditional security field, as well as specific cooperation in the non-traditional security field.³⁹ At this time, among ASEAN states, the two concepts of following the survival instinct and following the ASEAN framework are being balanced.

Changes in the external environment make the “variant” concept of adhering to the ASEAN framework continue to grow. The Asian financial

crisis in 1997 swept across Southeast Asian states, which seriously threatened the political security and social security of Southeast Asia and other states, thus endangering the economic and security cooperation of all states. The financial crisis has strengthened the determination of all states to cooperate within the ASEAN framework and maintain the norms and stability of ASEAN.⁴⁰ In December 1997, the ASEAN Summit adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 through consensus, pointing out that ASEAN should be built into a friendly, closely connected, open and stable community by 2020.⁴¹ The terrorist attacks in Bali in 2002 made ASEAN states strengthen their attention to non-traditional security, such as terrorism, the epidemic, and immigration. During this period, the concept of strengthening security cooperation within the ASEAN framework was institutionalized into the 2003 Bali Second Treaty Declaration (also known as the ASEAN Second Declaration of Coordination Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Rodolfo, 2008)⁴², under which ASEAN states cooperate to address a range of traditional and non-traditional security issues.

The Bali second agreement declaration proposed to build an ASEAN community in 2020, ASEAN community by ASEAN security community, ASEAN economic community, and ASEAN social and cultural community in three parts, the three final pursuits respectively to give up the use of force to resolve disputes with each other, realize the ASEAN regional economic integration and the Southeast Asia region into a friendly community.⁴³ Since then, the security norms in the ASEAN region have been continuously stable, and they have been deepened into the institutional system with political security, and economic and cultural community as the three pillars. The concept document of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Conference (ADMM) in 2006 reiterated that ASEAN should be used as a core driving force for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. In January 2007, ASEAN states advanced the establishment of the ASEAN community at the 12th ASEAN Summit in 2015. In the survival instinct and the "mutation", the latter has gradually gained the upper hand.⁴⁴

The Enactment of the ASEAN Charter and the Consolidation of the Security Concept

Since entering the new century, the external environment has changed again, the process of economic globalization has accelerated, and China, India, and other economies have risen rapidly. External environment changes "choice" obey the ASEAN framework this concept can continue to exist, with the horizontal transmission and longitudinal transmission of ASEAN norms, and ASEAN specification internationalization and international norms of ASEAN interaction, observing the concept are better than following the concept of survival instinct, which is a stable specification of close security alliance than

a flexible specification of the loose security alliance. ASEAN states are deeply aware of the importance of accelerating the process of regional integration and strengthening cooperation within the ASEAN framework, giving ASEAN a stable framework of norms and rules and a more efficient and simplified decision-making process. In November 2007, at the 13th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN leaders signed the ASEAN Charter, which officially came into force the following year. The ASEAN Charter affirms the construction of the ASEAN community in terms of norms and institutions. When the ASEAN Community is built, it will give Southeast Asian states a collective identity and act on this basis to meet external challenges together.⁴⁵ The introduction of the ASEAN Charter marks that the external environment makes ASEAN states choose to abide by the concept of the ASEAN framework. ASEAN states have established close security alliances with stability and norms and evolved towards a loose security community.

The ASEAN Charter for the first time gives ASEAN legal personality and formulated specific measures to establish an ASEAN community. ASEAN's organizational capacity and institutional framework determine the legitimacy of ASEAN's existence in the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁶ Therefore, the ASEAN Charter focuses on strengthening its organizational capacity and institutional framework. The ASEAN Charter is divided into 13 chapters and 55 articles. The Fourth Chapter adjusts the organizational structure of ASEAN, changes the loose and weak connection between the ASEAN institutions in the past, integrates resources, and makes the ASEAN departments close and well coordinated. In addition, paragraph 7 stipulates that the ASEAN Summit (ASEAN Summit) is the highest decision-making body of ASEAN, with four councils, respectively in charge of political security, economic security, cultural security, and coordination. As a result, the various ASEAN departments are not only closely connected, but also much more efficient. Paragraph 9 stipulates that the ASEAN Community will be composed of three parts: political and security community, economic community, and social and cultural community, and focuses on regional non-traditional security issues such as human rights and the environment.⁴⁷

The ASEAN charter makes ASEAN states establish a close and unified security alliance image, the benefits of the image and prompted ASEAN states to observe the concept of the ASEAN framework of deepening and promoting ASEAN specification in the ASEAN internal and external communication, thus forming a virtuous cycle, prompting ASEAN as a stable close security alliance continues to evolve. The possibility of this evolution is embodied in the ASEAN Charter, which emphasizes the central position of ASEAN. In the cooperation between ASEAN and the major states, the dominant position of ASEAN should be strengthened, to avoid marginalization, and the positive role of national cooperation should be played under the framework of ASEAN.⁴⁸ ASEAN Centrality (ASEAN centrality) is the most prominent organizational

principle of ASEAN, and it has become a fixed term for international relations in East Asia.⁴⁹ To put it simply, ASEAN's centrality is to emphasize that ASEAN should be the institutional center for Asia-Pacific cooperation. This move has promoted the interaction between ASEAN norms and international norms and made the mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Europe Conference, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the "ASEAN + 1" and the "ASEAN + 3" continue to exist, and advance.

The changes in ASEAN security norms are embodied in ASEAN's elaboration on building a political and security community. In February 2009, ASEAN states signed the Roadmap for Building the ASEAN Community for 2009-2015 (Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015), which provides detailed plans for the construction of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community. Among them, the part of the ASEAN Political and Security Community is called the "ASEAN Political-Security Community Building Blueprint" (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint).

The blueprint emphasizes that the ASEAN Community should be normative and stable. The stability of norms is embodied in three aspects: First, the stability of ASEAN political norms, that is, to emphasize the democracy and the rule of law of ASEAN states, the respect and protection of human rights and freedom, and to institutionalize the norms, and finally to build a united institutional community. second, the stability of security norms, which emphasizes the "compound security" of the ASEAN region, includes not only traditional security fields such as political security and military security, but also non-traditional security such as economic security, social security, and environmental security. ASEAN states should conduct "altruistic" cooperation under the ASEAN framework to carry out conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction work. Finally, it is the stability of external norms, that is, emphasizing that in the exchanges between ASEAN lies in states outside the region. We should maintain the "central position of ASEAN in ASEAN", carry out cooperation between ASEAN states and foreign states under the framework of ASEAN inclusive system, and make every effort to promote the building of an ASEAN community by 2015.⁵⁰

In November 2015, ASEAN states issued the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Building the ASEAN Community and the ASEAN Community 2025: Moving Forward Together at the ASEAN Summit 27th, announcing the successful establishment of the ASEAN Community by the end of the year and planning the development route of the ASEAN Community to 2025. This marks the completion of the evolution of ASEAN from a close security alliance with stable norms in the ASEAN Charter in 2007 to the characteristics of a significantly loose security community in 2015. In the specific diplomatic practice, ASEAN states have evolved from cooperating with states outside the region without cooperating with ASEAN states to giving priority to cooperation with ASEAN states, with the help of "ASEAN central status"

The Inertia of Safety Norms and the Unity of the Security Concept

Overall, by the end of 2015, ASEAN had built into a loose security community. The loose security community is constructivist. As Amitav Achaya said, the ASEAN Community is based on a common understanding of norms and relies on loose systems to achieve cooperation and resolve conflicts, to realize its interests through peaceful means. This community is different from collective security and military alliances, and it does not rely on rigid legal systems but is based on the inertia of a social norm.⁵²

The ASEAN community relies on dialogue and communication, reduces differences, forms a soft system through consensus and “maximum comfort level”, and achieves the goal of cooperation and security. On the other hand, since the ASEAN community is constructivist, the construction of security norms must be a long-term process, and the common culture cannot be constructed in a short time. At present, ASEAN security norms are still limited to the maintenance of some basic principles, namely sovereignty and equality, territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. When it comes to sovereignty, ASEAN plays an extremely limited role, which is the future evolution direction towards a close security community.

ASEAN security norms have two major sources: legal norms derived from the Westphalia international system and social norms derived from the local culture of ASEAN states. Among them, the former is a universal norm, while the latter constitutes a unique “ASEAN norm” (the ASEAN Way). The interactive evolution of these two norms constitutes the vertical dimension of the “inheritance” of security norms in ASEAN states.⁵³

In addition, there is also a horizontal dimension of the “inheritance” of security norms in ASEAN states, that is, the normative interaction among ASEAN member states. Since the end of the Cold War, although the ASEAN norms have been questioned and partially damaged, they have finally evolved and developed overall. Changes in the external environment and various practical crises do not hinder ASEAN norms in guiding the internal exchanges of member states and the building of regional communities.⁵⁴

In other words, ASEAN norms have a “genetic” effect, namely, the inertia of development and moving forward. The ASEAN norms are “inherited” by the unchanged basic principles. What changes only is the institutional form formulated according to the principle to adapt to the environment. Therefore, despite the lack of material power, ASEAN influences the establishment of a regional institutional framework by influencing the socialization of other actors. With the deepening of the adaptability of ASEAN norms, ASEAN states establish when cooperation security norms fully cover all behaviors of ASEAN states, that is, ASEAN norms are the ASEAN system, and ASEAN states have

adopted altruistic cooperative behaviors both within and outside the region, and ASEAN states have established a close security community. The inertia of ASEAN norms and the unity of the security concept were well reflected in the Myanmar junta coup in 2021. In February 2021, the Burmese military junta staged a coup that controlled the government, cut off the Internet, closed the stock market, and arrested a large number of politicians, including Aung San Suu Kyi, who won the general election. Subsequently, the military announced a takeover of the government for a year and suppressed the protests.⁵⁵

The 2021 Myanmar military coup 2021 is a manifestation of the degradation of the norms of individual ASEAN member states, which violates both international norms and adopts non-cooperation in both the international structure and the ASEAN framework. The inertia of ASEAN norms is mainly reflected in the response of the member states to the 2021 Myanmar coup. Since its establishment, ASEAN has been based on non-interference in internal affairs. The 1967 ASEAN Declaration clearly stated that all member states should prevent external interference and maintain their domestic and regional security situation and stability.⁵⁶

Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines insisted on the value norms of non-interference in their domestic affairs, while Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia condemned the military junta's use of military force against civilians and called for the restoration of democracy . ASEAN invited junta leader Min-Rhine (Min Aung Hlaing) to participate in a series of online meetings to try to resolve disputes. Malaysian diplomats met with junta officials, and the ASEAN summit in Indonesia was also allowed to attend.⁵⁷

All ASEAN states have agreed to bring Myanmar into the framework of the ASEAN system and adopt cooperation on the ASEAN platform to resolve disputes rather than military intervention. This is the inertia of cooperative security norms. ⁵⁸In November 2020, at the 37th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN states issued the ASEAN Community Post-2025 Vision Hanoi Declaration, the declaration is made against the ASEAN Declaration.⁵⁹

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Charter , the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook and the reiterating of a series of ASEAN norms, emphasstressed the importance of ASEAN in safeguarding regional peace and security and promoting regional cooperation and development. From March 31, 2022, to April 1, the ASEAN community vision after 2025 working group held the first meeting in the ASEAN secretariat, 2022 vision implementation, and specific implementation plan, emphasizing ASEAN should focus on regional traditional security and non-traditional security, regional cooperation under the system framework, ASEAN community to take concerted action to meet various challenges.⁶⁰ It is foreseeable that although ASEAN will still encounter various setbacks and challenges in the future, these challenges cannot prevent ASEAN cooperative security from evolving from a loose security community to a close security community.

Conclusion

After the Cold War, the development of security norms in ASEAN states shows the direction of social evolution, and it is a convergent evolution (convergent evolution). Convergent evolution is when an organism exhibits similar or identical traits in similar environments. Birds, which feed on nectar, for example, have evolved pointed, long bills .

After the Cold War, ASEAN states were faced with a similar external environment and similar performance behaviors, that is, the horizontal acceptance of the spread of ASEAN norms and the vertical deepening of ASEAN norms. With the change in the external environment after the Cold War, the convergent evolution of ASEAN states strengthens the adaptability of ASEAN to ASEAN norms. At the end of the Cold War, ASEAN states only followed the concept of survival instinct, both in the international structure and the ASEAN framework, they adopted self-selfish cooperation. At this time, ASEAN was a loose security alliance that adopted flexible norms. The release of the Singapore Declaration in 1992 marked the birth of the new variant concept of compliance with the ASEAN framework. The 1994 ASEAN Regional Forum showed a balanced situation between old ideas and new variant ideas. Subsequently, after the 1997 financial crisis, the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Second Bali Accord Declaration in 2003, and the ASEAN Summit in January 2007, the community-building time was advanced to 2015, and the concept of compliance with the ASEAN framework has gradually enhanced, and the adaptability of ASEAN states to ASEAN norms has also strengthened with the signing of a series of documents.

The introduction of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the formation of the ASEAN institutional framework system built to maintain its central position mark that ASEAN has become a close security alliance with stability and norms. However, the adaptation and expansion of ASEAN security norms did not stop, and the concept of observing the ASEAN framework continued to expand. In 2009, ASEAN states signed the ASEAN Community 2009-2015 Construction Roadmap, which reflects the expansion of ASEAN political norms, security norms, and external norms, as well as the good adaptability of ASEAN states to ASEAN norms. In 2015, after the 27th ASEAN Summit, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Completion of the ASEAN Community 2015 was issued, and ASEAN announced the completion of the ASEAN Community. Since then, only one concept of the socially evolving “choice” has survived, namely, the idea of adhering to the ASEAN framework. ASEAN states have also built a loose security community, firmly chosen cooperative altruism within the ASEAN framework, and do not necessarily adopt cooperation in the international structure.

With the deepening of the adaptability of ASEAN states, ASEAN norms appeared a “genetic” effect, namely ASEAN states produced inertia

of following the ASEAN norms and institutional framework, not only within the framework of ASEAN consciously take long-term cooperation behavior, when communicating with states outside the region also more and more take cooperation behavior. After the 2021 Burmese junta coup, Myanmar remains cooperative within the ASEAN framework and has reached a partial compromise with the international community to avoid military confrontation. The 37th ASEAN summit in 2020 “after 2025 vision”, “vision” did not stop because of the Burma military coup, 2022 to carry out the vision to carry out work, ASEAN states according to the cooperative security specification inertia to close security community evolution, namely in the ASEAN and international structure cooperation behavior of weak sovereignty, strong community forward.

Endnotes

1. Acharya Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community: ASEAN and the Regional Order*, London: Routledge, 2001, pp.110-125.
2. Megan Price, “Norm erosion and Australia’s challenge to the rules-based order,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*,2021, 75(2): 161–165.
3. Philippe Bourbeau, 2013. “Resiliencism: premises and promises in securitisation research,” *Resilience*, 1(1): 3-10.
4. Acharya Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community:ASEAN and the Regional Order*, London: Routledge, 2001, 30-50.
5. Narine Shaun, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp.
6. Taku Yukawa, The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses on the ASEAN Norms, *The Pacific Review*, 2018, 31(3), 298-314.
7. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Neither Skepticism nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game,” *The Pacific Review*, 2006, 19(2): 219–227.
8. Mark Beeson, “ASEAN’s Ways: still Fit for Purpose,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2009, 22(3): 333–343.
9. Alex Hsueh, “ASEAN and Southeast Peace: National Building Economic Performance and ASEAN Security Management,” *International Relations of Asia-Pacific*, 2016, 16(1): 27–30.
10. Tobias Nischalke, “Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of Regional Community,” *Pacific Review*, 2002, 15(1): 89–95.
11. Xiao Bin, “Shuangbian yu Duo Bian: Dongmeng yu Ou meng Qu Yu Jian Zhu Yi Guan Xi de Yan Bian,”(Bilateral and multiple debates: the Evolution of Interregional Relations Between ASEAN

- and the EU) *Nan Yang Wen Ti Yan Jiu*, 2009, 2: 17-21. [肖斌, <双边与多辩: 东盟与欧盟区域间主义关系的演变>, 《南洋问题研究》].
12. Wang Zhengyi, *Bianyuan Di Dai Fa Zhan Lun: Shi Jie Ti Xi Yu Dong Nan Ya* (Fridge Development: World System and Southeast Asia), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing House, 1997, pp. 250-265. [王正毅. 《边缘地带发展论: 世界体系与东南亚发展》. 上海: 上海人民出版社.].
13. Cao Yunhua, *Dong Nan Ya Guo Jia Lian Meng: Jie Gou, Yun Zuo Yu Dui Wai Guan Xi* (Alliance of Southeast Asian states: Structure, Operation, and Foreign Relations), Beijing: China Economic Press, 2011 [曹云华. 东南亚国家联盟: 结构、运作与对外关系, 北京: 中国经济出版社.]; Zhao Chen, *Dong Nan Ya Guo Jia Lian Meng: Cheng Li Fa zhan Tong Zhu Yao Da Guo Guan Xi* (Alliance of Southeast Asian states: Establish and develop relations with major powers, Beijing: Chinese Materials and Materials Press, 1994. [赵晨. 《东南亚国家联盟: 成立发展同主要大国的关系》. 北京: 中国物资出版社.].
14. Wang Shilu, Wang Guoping, *Con Dong Meng Dao Da Dong Meng: Dong Meng 30 Nian Fa Zhan Yan Jiu* (From ASEAN to Greater ASEAN: 30 years of ASEAN development research), Beijing: The World Knowledge Press, 2003. [王士录、王国平. 《从东盟到大东盟: 东盟30年发展研究》, 北京: 世界知识出版社.].
15. He Shengda, Ma Yong, *Zou Xiang 21 Shi Ji de Dong Nan Ya Yu Zhong Guo* (Towards Southeast Asia and China in the 21st century), Kunming: Yunnan University Press, 1997. [贺圣达、马勇. 走向21世纪的东南亚与中国. 昆明: 云南大学出版社.]; Li Qin, *Dongnan Ya Jing Ji Gai Lun* (An Introduction to the Southeast Asian Economy, Kunming: Yunnan Nationalities Press, 1999 [李勤. 《东南亚经济概论》. 昆明: 云南民族出版社.]; Liao Shaolian, *Dong Meng Qu Yu Jing Ji He Zuo Yan Jiu* (Study on ASEAN Regional Economic Cooperation, Beijing: Chinese International Business and Trade Press, 2003. [廖少廉. 《东盟区域经济合作研究》. 北京: 中国对外经济贸易出版社.].
16. Wang Zi Chang and Guo Youxin, *Guo Jia Li Yi Hai Shi Di Qu Li Yi: Dong Meng He Zuo De Zheng Zhi Jing Ji Xue* (National interest or regional interest: the political Economy of ASEAN cooperation), Beijing: The World Knowledge Press, 2005. [王子昌、郭又新. 《国家利益还是地区利益: 东盟合作的政治经济学》. 北京: 世界知识出版社.]; Wei Ming, *Min Zu Zhu Yi yu Di Qu Zhu Yi De Hu Dong: Dong Meng Yan Jiu Xin Shi Jiao* (Interaction between nationalism and Regionalism: a new perspective of ASEAN research), Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005. [韦明. 《民族主义与地

- 区主义的互动：东盟研究新视角》. 北京：北京大学出版社。].
17. Lin Ruyu, *Dong Xie Gong Tong Ti De Jian Gou Yu Cheng Li 4C An Quan Wen Hua zhi Lilun yu Shijian* (Construction and Establishment of Eastern Association Community: Theory and practice of “4C Safety Culture”), Taipei: San Min Shu Ju, 2016, pp.215-230.[林若粤.《东协共同体的建构与成立：“4C安全文化”之理论与实践》.台北市：三民书局。].
 18. Lu Guangsheng, *Di Qu Zhu Yi Yu Jing Ji He Zuo* (Regionalism and Economic Cooperation), Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 2008. [卢光盛.地区主义与经济合作.上海：上海辞书出版社。].
 19. Zheng Xianwu, *An Quan, He Zuo yu Gongtonti: Dongnan ya An Quan Qu Yu Zhu Yi Lilun yu Shi Jian* (Security, Cooperation and Community: Theory and practice of Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia), Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2009. [郑先武.《安全、合作与共同体：东南亚安全区域主义理论与实践》.南京：南京大学出版社。]; Zheng Xianwu, *Qu Yu Jian Zhu Yi Zhi Li Mo Shi* (Inter-Regional Governance Model), Beijing: The Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014.[郑先武.《区域间主义治理模式》.北京：社会科学文献出版社。].
 20. Jiang Fan, *Li Shi Zhi Du Zhu Yi Shi Jiao Xia Donmeng An Quan gongtongti Gui lu Bian Qian Yan Jiu* (Study on the Change Law of ASEAN Security Community from the Perspective of Historical Institutionalism), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2013. [江帆.《历史制度主义视角下东盟安全共同体变迁规律究》.北京：中国社会科学出版社。].
 21. Louise K. Comfort (ed), *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events*. USA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.
 22. Yan Xiaoxiao, “Ren Xing Yan Jiu: Dui An Quan Zhi Li de PiPan Xing Fan Si Ji Qi Chao Yue,” (Resilience Research: Critical Reflection on Security Governance and Its transcendence), *Ou Zhou Yan Jiu*, 2017, 2, pp.21-37. [严骁骁, <韧性研究：安全治理的批判性反思及其超越>,《欧洲研究》。].
 23. Guo Zishi, Hong Yousheng, “Alliance Consolidation Under New Circumstances: An Assessment of NATO’s Resilience Agenda,” *International Outlook*, 2022, 4:132-152. [郭籽实、洪邮生.<北约韧性议程评析——新形势下联盟的强化>,《国际展望》。].
 24. Tang Shiping, *The Social Evolution of International Politics: From 8,000 BC to The Future*, Beijing: ZhongXin press, 2017, pp.50-65.
 25. Ibid, pp. 103-107.
 26. Ibid, pp. 145-149.
 27. Li Yuhong, Zhang Manna, and Zhu Zhanhang, “Study on the

Article: Yuhong Li, Junze Feng and Anguang Zheng

- Interaction Between Regional Security Norms and National Form in Southeast Asia: An Intervention Cost Analysis,” *Journal of China-ASEAN Studies*, 2022, 2 (2): 1-16 .
28. Micheal Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge,1990.
29. Ludo Cuyvers, “The ‘ASEAN Way’ and ASEANs development gap with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam: a critical view,” *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 2019, 25(5): 683-704.
30. Narine Shaun, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002; Weatherbee Donald, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy*, London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
31. Rüländ Jürgen, “Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: Multilateral Utility or Hedging Utility,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 2011 33(1): 91-103.
32. Hiro Katsumata, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a ‘Talk Shop’ or a ‘Norm Brewery’?,” *The Pacific Review*, 2006, 19(2): 181-185; Alice D Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia:Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2009.
33. Wang Zi Chang and Guo Youxin, *Guo Jia Li Yi Hai Shi Di Qu Li Yi: Dong meng He Zuo De Zhengzhi Jingji xue* (National interest or regional interest: the political economy of ASEAN cooperation), Beijing: The World Knowledge Press, 2005. [王子昌、郭又新. 《国家利益还是地区利益: 东盟合作的政治经济学》. 北京: 世界知识出版社.].
34. Li Yuhong, Zheng Anguang, “*Nan Hai Wen Ti Dong Meng Hua Yu Dong Mneg Yi Ti Hua Hu Dong Yan Jiu*,” (Interactive research on the "ASEAN" of the South China Sea issue and ASEAN integration, *The Journal of South China Sea Studies*, 2021, 7(4): 71-75.
35. Shaun Narine, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
36. Rüländ Jürgen, “Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: Multilateral Utility or Hedging Utility,”*Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 2011, 33(1): 91-95.
37. Hiro Katsumata, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a ‘Talk Shop’ or a ‘Norm Brewery’?,” *The Pacific Review*, 2006, 19(2): 181-190.
38. Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture*, London: Routledge, 2003; Ralf Emmers, “The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: Security Expectations and Outcomes Australian,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 2005, 59(1): 71-85.

39. Estrella D. Solidum, *The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism*. Eastern University Press, 2003.
40. Jiang Fan, *Li Shi Zhi Du Zhu Yi Shi Jiao Xia Donmeng An Quan gongtongti Gui lu Bian Qian Yan Jiu* (Study on the Change Law of ASEAN Security Community from the Perspective of Historical Institutionalism), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2013. [江帆. 《历史制度主义视角下东盟安全共同体变迁规律研究》. 北京: 中国社会科学出版社.].
41. Wei Ming, *Min Zu Zhu Yi yu Di Qu Zhu Yi de Hu Dong: Dongmeng Yan Jiu Xin Shi Jiao* (Interaction between nationalism and regionalism: a new perspective of ASEAN research), Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005 [韦明. 《民族主义 与地区主义的互动: 东盟研究新视角》. 北京: 北京大学出版社.].
42. Severino Rodolfo, "Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General," *Development in Practice*, 2008, 18(3): 451-453.
43. Wang Shilu, Wang Guoping, *Con Dong Meng Dao Da Dong Meng: Dong Meng 30 Nian Fa Zhan Yan Jiu* (From ASEAN to Greater ASEAN: 30 Years of ASEAN Development Research, Beijing: The World Knowledge Press, 2003, pp. 250-260. [王士录、王国平. 《从东盟到大东盟: 东盟30年发展研究》. 北京: 世界知识出版社.].
44. Cao Yunhua, *Dongnan ya GuoJia Lian Meng: Jie Gou, Yun Zuo Yu Dui wai Guan Xi* (Alliance of Southeast Asian states: Structure, Operation, and Foreign Relations), Beijing: China Economic Press, 2011, pp. 315-330. [曹云华. 东南亚国家联盟: 结构、运作与对外关系. 北京: 中国经济出版社.].
45. Zheng Xianwu, *An Quan, He Zuo Yu Gongtongti: Dongnan Ya An Quan Qu Yu Zhu Yi Lilun Yu Shi Jian* (Security, Cooperation and Community: Theory and practice of Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia), Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2009, pp. 50-65. [郑先武. 《安全、合作与共同体: 东南亚安全区域主义理论与实践》. 南京: 南京大学出版社.].
46. Michael Wesley, "The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 1999, 21(1): 54-73; Severino Rodolfo, "Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General," *Development in Practice*, 2008, 18(3): 451-453.
47. Zheng Xianwu, *Qu Yu Jian Zhu Yi Zhi Li Mo Shi* (Inter-Regional Governance Model), Beijing: The Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014. [郑先武. 《区域间 主义治理模式》. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社.].
48. Ludo Cuyvers, "The 'ASEAN Way' and ASEANs development

Article: Yuhong Li, Junze Feng and Anguang Zheng

- gap with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam: a critical view,” *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 2019, 25(5): 683-704.
49. Acharya Amitav, “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 2017, 39(2): 273-275.
50. Hiro Katsumata, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a ‘Talk Shop’ or a ‘Norm Brewery’?,” *The Pacific Review*, 2006, 19(2): 181-185.
51. Lin Ruyu, *Dong xie Gong Tong Ti De Jian Gou Yu Cheng Li 4C An Quan Wen hua Zhi Li Lun Yu Shi Jian* (Construction and Establishment of Eastern Association Community: Theory and practice of “4C Safety Culture, Taipei: San Min Shu Ju, 2016, pp.197-200. [林若瑜. 《东协共同体的建构与成立：“4C安文化之理论与实践》. 台北市：三民书局]; Taku Yukawa, *The ASEAN Way Review*, 2018, 31:3, pp. 298-305.
52. Acharya Amitav, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism”, *International Organization*, 2004, 58(2): 239-245; Kahler Miles, “Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case,” *International Organization*, 2000, 54(3): 549-555.
53. Acharya Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, London: Routledge, 2014a. Acharya Amitav, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, London: Routledge, 2014b.
54. Alex Hsueh, “ASEAN and Southeast Peace: National Building Economic Performance and ASEAN Security Management,” *International Relations of Asia-Pacific*, 2016, 16(1): 27–66.
55. *BBC News*. Myanmar Coup: The People Shot Dead since the Protests Began, 13April 2021.
56. Richard Stubbs, 2008. “The ASEAN Alternative Ideas, Institutions, and the Challenge to ‘Global’ Governance,” *Pacific Review*, 21(4): 451-455.
57. Jiang Fan, 2013. *Li Shi Zhi Du Zhu Yi Shi Jiao Xia Donmeng An Quan gong Tong Ti Gui Lu Bian Qian Yan Jiu* (Study on the Change Law of ASEAN Security Community from the Perspective of Historical Institutionalism), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2013, p.70-80. [江帆. 《历史制度主义视角下东盟安全共同体变迁规律研究》. 北京：中国社会科学出版社.].
58. Rüländ Jürgen, “Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: Multilateral Utility or Hedging Utility,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 2011, 33(1): 99-103.
59. Xiao Bin, “Shuangbian yu Duo Bian: Dongmeng yu Ou meng Qu Yu Jian Zhu Yi Guan Xi de Yan Bian ,” (Bilateral and multiple debates:

the Evolution of Interregional Relations Between ASEAN and the EU), *Nan Yang Wen Ti Yan Jiu*, 2009, 2, pp. 17-21. [肖斌, <双边与多辩: 东盟与欧盟区域间主义关系的演变>, 《南洋问题研究》].

60. *Vietnam News Agency*. ASEAN discussed the Vision of the ASEAN Community after 2025, 3 April 2022.

References

- Acharya, A. 2001. *Constructing a Security Community: ASEAN and the Regional Order*, London: Routledge.
- Acharya, A. 2004. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism", *International Organization*, 58(2): 239-275.
- Acharya, A. 2014a. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, London: Routledge.
- Acharya, A. 2014b. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, London: Routledge.
- Acharya, A. 2017. "The Myth of ASEAN Centrality," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 39(2): 273.
- Hsueh, A. 2016. "ASEAN and Southeast Peace: National Building Economic Performance and ASEAN Security Management," *International Relations of Asia-Pacific*, 16(1): 27-66.
- Ba, A. 2009. *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
- BBC News*. Myanmar Coup: The People Shot Dead since the Protests Began, 13 April 2021.
- Boston Globe*. How to Keep Myanmar from Becoming Another US Failure, 2 April 2021.
- Bourbeau, P. 2013. "Resiliencism: premises and promises in securitisation research," *Resilience*, 1(1): 3-17.
- Cao, Y. 2011. *Dongnan ya GuoJia Lian Meng: Jie gou, Yun zuo yu Dui wai guan xi* (Alliance of Southeast Asian states: Structure, Operation, and Foreign Relations), Beijing: China Economic Press. [曹云华. 东南亚国家联盟: 结构、运作与对外关系, 北京: 中国经济出版社。].
- Comfort, L.K.(ed). 2010. *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events*. USA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Cuyvers, L. 2019. "The 'ASEAN Way' and ASEANs development gap with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam: a critical view," *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 25(5): 683-704.

Article: Yuhong Li, Junze Feng and Anguang Zheng

- Emmers, R. 2005. "The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: Security Expectations and Outcomes Australian," *Journal of International Affairs*, 59(1): 71-88.
- Guo,Z., Hong Y. 2022. "Alliance Consolidation Under New Circumstances: An Assessment of NATO's Resilience Agenda," *International Outlook*, 2022, 4: 132-152. [郭籽实、洪邮生.<北约韧性议程评析——新形势下联盟的强化>,《国际展望》。].
- Haacke, J. 2003. *ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture*, London: Routledge.
- He, S., Ma,Y. 1997. *Zou Xiang 21 Shi Ji de Dong Nan Ya Yu Zhong Guo* (Towards Southeast Asia and China in the 21st century), Kunming: Yunnan University Press. [贺圣达、马勇. 走向21世纪的东南亚与中国. 昆明: 云南大学出版社。].
- Ishikawa, K. 2021. "The ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Economic integration," *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*,10(1): 24-41.
- Jiang, F. 2013. *Li Shi Zhi Du Zhu Yi Shi Jiao Xia Donmeng An Quan gongtongti Gui lu Bian Qian Yan Jiu* (Study on the Change Law of ASEAN Security Community from the Perspective of Historical Institutionalism), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. [江帆. 《历史制度主义视角下东盟安全共同体变迁规律研究》. 北京: 中国社会科学出版社。].
- Johnston, A. 2014. *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jürgen, R. 2011. "Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: Multilateral Utility or Hedging Utility," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33(1): 91-103.
- Katsumata, H. 2006. "Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a 'Talk Shop' or a 'Norm Brewery'?", *The Pacific Review*, 19(2): 181-198.
- Kawasaki, T. 2006. "Neither Skepticism nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game," *The Pacific Review*, 19(2): 219-227.
- Li, Q., 1999. *Dongnan ya Jingji Gai Lun* (An Introduction to the Southeast Asian Economy), Kunming: Yunnan Nationalities Press. [李勤. 《东南亚经济概论》. 昆明: 云南民族出版社。].
- Li, Y., Zhang, M., and Zhu, Z. 2022. "Study on the Interaction Between Regional Security Norms and National Form in Southeast Asia: An Intervention Cost Analysis," *Journal of China-ASEAN Studies*, 2 (2):1-16.
- Li,Y., Zheng, A. 2021. "Nan Hai Wen Ti Donmeng Hua Yu Dongmnege Yi Ti Hua Hu Dong Yan Jiu," (Interactive research on the "ASEAN" of the South China Sea issue and ASEAN integration), *The Journal of*

- South China Sea Studies*, 2021, 7(4): 71-84.
- Liao, S. 2003. *Dongmeng Qu Yu Jing Ji He Zuo Yan Jiu* (Study on ASEAN Regional Economic Cooperation), Beijing: Chinese International Business and Trade Press. [廖少廉.《东盟区域经济合作研究》.北京:中国对外经济贸易出版社。].
- Lin, R. 2016. *Dong Xie Gong Tong Ti De Jian Gou Yu Cheng Li* 4C An Quan wen Hua zhi Lilun yu Shijian (*Construction and Establishment of Eastern Association Community: Theory and practice of "4C Safety Culture"*), Taipei: San Min Shu ju. [林若雱.《东协共同体的建构与成立：“4C安全文化”之理论与实践》.台北市:三民书局].
- Leifer, M. 1990. *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*. Routledge.
- Lu, G. 2008. *Di Qu Zhu Yi yu Jing Ji He Zuo* (Regionalism and Economic Cooperation), Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House. [卢光盛.地区主义与经济合作.上海:上海辞书出版社。].
- Mark Beeson, 2009. “ASEAN’s Ways: still Fit for Purpose,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22(3): 333–343.
- Martin-Jones, D., & Smith, M. 2007. “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order,” *International Security*, 32(1): 148-184.
- Miles, K. 2000. “Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case,” *International Organization*, 54(3): 549-571.
- Narine, S. 2002. *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Nikkei Asian Review*. Malaysia Envoy’s Meeting with Myanmar Junta Sparks Uproar, 8 April 2021.
- Nischalke, T. 2002. “Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the idea of Regional Community,” *Pacific Review*, 15(1): 89–117.
- New York Times. General Who Led Myanmar’s Coup Joins Regional Talk on the Crisis, 24 April 2021.
- Price, M. 2021. “Norm erosion and Australia’s challenge to the rules-based order,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 75(2): 161–177.
- Rodolfo, S. 2008. “Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General,” *Development in Practice*, 18(3): 451-453.
- Stubbs, R. 2008. “The ASEAN Alternative Ideas, Institutions, and the Challenge to ‘Global’ Governance,” *Pacific Review*, 21(4): 451-468.
- Solidum, E. 2003. *The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism*. Eastern University Press.
- Tang, S. 2017. *The Social Evolution of International Politics: From 8,000 BC to The Future*, Beijing: Zhong Xin Press.
- Vietnam News Agency. ASEAN discussed the Vision of the ASEAN Community after 2025, 3 April 2022.

Article: Yuhong Li, Junze Feng and Anguang Zheng

Wang, S., Wang G. 2003. *Con Dong Meng dao Da Dong Meng: Dong Meng 30 Nian Fa Zhan Yan Jiu*.

(From ASEAN to Greater ASEAN: 30 years of ASEAN Development Research), Beijing: The World Knowledge Press. [王士录、王国平. 《从东盟到大东盟: 东盟30年发展研究》. 北京: 世界知识出版社.].

Wang, Z. 1997. *Bianyuan Didai Fa Zhan Lun: Shi Jie Ti Xi Yu Dong Nan Ya* (Fridge Development: World System and Southeast Asia), Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing House. [王正毅. 《边缘地带发展论: 世界体系与东南亚发展》. 上海: 上海人民出版社.].

Wang, Z., Guo, Y. 2005. *Guojia Li i Hai Shi Di Qu Li Yi: Dong Meng He Zuo De Zhengzhi Jingji Xue* (National interest or Regional interest: the Political Economy of ASEAN Cooperation), Beijing: The World Knowledge Press. [王子昌、郭又新. 《国家利益还是地区利益东: 盟合作的政治经济学》. 北京: 世界知识出版社.].

Donald, W. 2005. *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy*, London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Wesley, M. 1999. "The Asian crisis and the adequacy of regional institutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 21(1): 54-73.

Wei, M. 2005. *Min Zu Zhu Yi yu Di Qu Zhu Yi De Hu Dong : Dongmeng Yan Jiu Xin Shi Jiao* (Interaction between nationalism and regionalism: a new perspective of ASEAN research), Beijing: Peking University Press. [韦明. 《民族主义与地区主义的互动: 东盟研究新视角》. 北京: 北京大学出版社.].

Xiao, B. 2009. "Shuangbian yu Duo Bian: Dongmeng Yu Ou Meng Qu Yu Jian Zhu Yi Guan Xi De Yan Bian ," (Bilateral and Multiple Debates: the Evolution of Interregional Relations Between ASEAN and the EU), *Nan Yang Wen Ti Yan Jiu*, 2009, 2. [肖斌, <双边与多辩: 东盟与欧盟区域间主义关系的演变>, 《南洋问题研究》].

Yukawa, T. 2018. The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses on the ASEAN Norms, *The Pacific Review*, 31:3, 298-314.

Yan, X. 2017. "Ren Xing Yan Jiu: Dui An Quan Zhi Li De PiPan Xing Fan Si ji Qi Chao Yue," (Resilience Research: Critical Reflection on Security Governance and Its transcendence), *Ou Zhou Yan Jiu*, 2: 21-37. [严骁骁, <韧性研究: 对安全治理的批判性反思及其超越>, 《欧洲研究》.].

Zhao, C. 1994. *Dong Nan Ya GuoJia Lian Meng: Cheng Li Fa Zhan Tong Zhu Ya Da Guo Guan Xi* (Alliance of Southeast Asian states: Establish and develop relations with major powers), Beijing: Chinese Materials and Materials Press. [赵晨. 《东南亚国家联盟: 成立发展同主要大国的关系》. 北京: 中国物资出版社.].

Zheng, X. 2009. *An Quan, He Zuo Yu Gongtonti: Dong Nan Ya An Quan Qu Yu Zhu Yi Lilun yu Shi Jian* (Security, Cooperation and Community:

Theory and Practice of Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia), Nanjing: Nanjing University Press. [郑先武. 《安全、合作与共同体: 东南亚安全区域主义理论与实践》. 南京: 南京大学出版社.].

Zheng, X. 2014. *Qu Yu Jian Zhu Yi Zhi Li Mo Shi* (Inter-Regional Governance Model), Beijing: The Social Sciences Academic Press. [郑先武. 《区域间主义治理模式》. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社.].

Biographical Notes

Yuhong Li (xr60514@163.com) he is studying the thesis on international affairs and international relations and research of the doctor of international relations of Nanjing University China in the Asia Pacific region. Published papers in international Research, *Jornal of South China Sea Studies*, *Macao Academic Journal*, *Macedonian Political Science Forum*, *Asia Pacific Humanities and Social Sciences* and other journals.

Junze Feng (121013946@qq.com) he is studying the thesis on international affairs and international relations and research of the Master of international relations of Nanjing University China in the Asia Pacific region.

Dr. Anguang Zheng (agzheng@nju.edu.cn) is an Associate Professor and deputy director of the Institute of International Studies, Nanjing University and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins-Nanjing Center. He got a Doctoral degree in 2004 from Nanjing University. His academic interest and studying fields include: international relations in Asian-Pacific region and global governance of public affairs. He has published two monographs and many articles on such journals as *American Studies*, *Contemporary International Relations* and *International Political Studies*. He did studies at University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana as Freeman Fellow between 2012-2013 and at Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies of Korea from 2007to 2008. He also did research at SAIS, Johns-Hopkins University in 2015.